Soft peg regimes : sensitivity to crises and performance by Gedik, Nilgün Şayeste
  
SOFT PEG REGIMES: SENSITIVITY to CRISES and 
PERFORMANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Master’s Thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
NĐLGÜN ŞAYESTE GEDĐK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of 
Economics 
Đhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University 
Ankara 
 
December 2011
  
SOFT PEG REGIMES: SENSITIVITY to CRISES and 
PERFORMANCE 
 
The Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences 
of 
Đhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University 
 
 
by 
 
 
NĐLGÜN ŞAYESTE GEDĐK 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
in 
 
 
 
 
THE DEPARTMENT OF 
ECONOMICS 
ĐHSAN DOĞRAMACI BĐLKENT UNIVERSITY 
ANKARA 
 
December 2011 
  
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in 
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Economics. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Assoc. Prof. Selin Sayek Böke 
Supervisor 
 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in 
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Economics. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Asst. Prof. Taner Yiğit 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
 
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in 
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Economics. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Assoc. Prof. Timur Han Gür 
Examining Committee Member 
 
 
 
Approval of the Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel 
Director
  
iii 
ABSTRACT 
SOFT PEG REGIMES: SENSITIVITY to CRISES and PERFORMANCE   
GEDĐK, Nilgün Ş. 
M.A., Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Selin Sayek Böke 
December 2011 
In this thesis, soft peg regimes’ sensitivity to crises and performance are investigated 
after a brief review of exchange rate regimes and their historical evolutions. The 
currency crisis faced by emerging countries under adaptation of soft peg regimes in the 
1990s and in the beginning of 2000s revealed the suspicions on soft peg regimes’ 
vulnerability to crisis. With the increased tendency of countries adaptation of floating   
regimes after abandonment of soft pegs, some arguments emerged inquiring the 
appearance of soft peg regimes in the literature. The Corner Hypothesis, which defends 
the disappearance of soft peg regimes and its counter argument The Fear Of Floating, 
which does not accept the disappearance and another argument The Basket, Band and 
Crawl Arrangements, which provides alternative soft peg regimes are analyzed in this 
thesis. However, soft peg regimes’ vulnerability to currency crisis should not be 
investigated without the emerging countries’ common characteristics, which can be 
counted as lack of sound financial and fiscal structure and strong institutional 
framework. At the end of this study, importance of strong financial and fiscal structure
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 of countries to provide macroeconomic balances including exchange rate regime is 
mentioned.     
Keywords: Exchange Rate Regime, The Corner Hypothesis, The Fear of Floating, The 
Basket, Band and Crawl Arrangements , Soft Peg Regimes, Currency Crises. 
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ÖZET 
ARA KUR REJĐMLERĐ: KRĐZLERE DUYARLILIKLARI ve 
PERFORMANSLARI 
GEDĐK, Nilgün Ş. 
Yüksek Lisans, Đktisat Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Selin Sayek Böke
 
Aralık, 2011 
Bu tezde döviz kur rejimleri ve zaman içerisinde gelişimleri kısaca gözden geçirildikten 
sonra, ara rejimlerin krizlere duyarlılıkları ve performansları incelenmiştir. 1990 ve 
2000li yıllarda gelişmekte olan ülkelerin ara rejim uygulamaları sırasında maruz 
kaldıkları krizler, ara rejimler hakkında süpheleri ortaya çıkarmıştır. Ülkelerin ara 
rejimleri terk edip, dalgalı rejimlere geçiş eğilimlerinin artması ile literatürde ara 
rejimlerin varlığı ile ilgili argümanlar ortaya çıkmıştır. Ara rejimlerin ortadan kalktığını 
savunun Köşe Hipotezi, ara rejimlerin ortadan kalktığına karşı hipotez Dalgalanma 
Korkusu ve ara rejimlere alternatif sunan Basket, Bant ve Emekleme Düzenlemeleri bu 
tezde incelenmiştir. Bunlara rağmen, ara rejimlerin krizlere duyarlılıkları, gelişmekte 
olan ülkelerin sağlam finansal ve mali yapı ve güçlü kurumsal çerçeveden yoksun 
olmaları gibi sayılabilecek ortak özelliklerden bağımsız olarak incelenmemelidir. Bu 
çalışmanın sonunda, ülkelerin güçlü mali ve finansal yapılarının döviz kuru rejimi de 
dahil, ülkelerin macroekonomik dengelerinin sağlanmasında ne kadar önemli oldukları
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 belirtilmiştir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Döviz Kuru Rejimleri, Köşe Hipotezi, Dalgalanma Korkusu, 
Basket,-Bant ve Emekleme düzenlemeleri, Ara Rejimler 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The choice of exchange rate regime is one of the most important macroeconomic 
decisions of governments, which affect both internal and external balances of a country. 
For centuries, governments have struggled to find the appropriate exchange rate regimes 
for their economic conditions. All regimes can be arranged according to their degree of 
flexibility from the most flexible to the least flexible. Although all regimes have 
advantages and disadvantages, none of the regimes’ superiority has been proved. As 
Frankel (1999) claims, no single currency regime is right for all countries or at all times 
because of different country characteristics and rapidly changing macroeconomic 
conditions. In the literature, emerging countries’ exchange rate choices and developed 
countries’ choices are investigated separately due to their different economic conditions. 
Calvo and Mishkin (2003) state that emerging countries’ macroeconomic success does 
not depend on the adopted exchange rate regime, but depends on the health of 
fundamental macroeconomic institutions, including institutions associated with fiscal 
and monetary stability.  
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In addition to these, a related important research area in the literature is different 
exchange rate regimes’ durability and performance. The collapse of the Bretton Woods 
System and the European Monetary System (EMS) caused some doubts over traditional 
pegs’ performance in advanced economies. Afterwards, in the 1990s and 2000s under 
soft peg regimes many emerging countries (East Asia, Turkey, Mexico, Ecuador etc.) 
faced with currency crises, which amplified the doubts over soft peg regimes’ durability. 
The corner hypothesis emerged in the literature at the end of 1990s, which argues that 
countries have a tendency to choose exchange rate regimes from the corner of the 
flexibility line. This hypothesis claims the reasons of trend towards the corner as 
unsustainable soft peg regimes with the increased capital mobility and bad experiences 
in last currency crises under soft peg regimes. However, the corner hypothesis, which 
defends hard pegs and floating regimes’ superiority over any intermediate regime, 
attracted suspicion with Argentina’s severe crisis under its hard peg regime. 
Subsequently, the fear of floating argument was developed by Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002), which rejects the disappearance of soft pegs but on the contrary defends that 
countries peg their currencies to a secret anchor by intervening in the foreign exchange 
market frequently, although they announce the application of a floating exchange rate 
regimes. On the other hand, Williamson (2000) suggested alternative intermediate 
regimes under “Basket, Band and Crawl (BBC)”standards, which may protect exchange 
rate from speculative attacks with wider bands and permissions for exchange rates to 
move outside the bands. 
In the light of these arguments, the objective of this paper is to investigate soft 
peg regimes’ sustainability, performance and their sensitivity to currency crisis. To reach 
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this objective, the arguments about soft peg regimes, the findings about their 
performance and their vulnerability to crises will be surveyed under the scope of 
countries’ economic and financial characteristics. Emerging countries’ successes and 
failures under soft peg regimes and the main reasons behind these will be discussed 
considering the severe crises emerging countries faced. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives a brief review of 
exchange rate regimes with the advantages and the disadvantages of these regimes. After 
that, historical trends of exchange rate regimes in the world are explained. In Chapter 3, 
soft pegs’ durability and performance are discussed under various arguments and 
empirical researches. In Chapter 4, crisis histories of some selected countries under soft 
peg adaptation will be talked about. These countries are Mexico, Asian countries, Brazil 
and Turkey. These countries’ crisis periods and reasons behind the crises will be 
investigated in that chapter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES 
 
 
2.1 Brief Review of Exchange Rate Regimes 
The exchange rate systems are defined in three main categories as hard peg, soft 
peg and floating arrangements in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) published in 
2009. Other systems, which cannot be put under these categories, are defined as “Other 
Managed Arrangements”. A detailed list for exchange rate regimes is given below. 
a) Hard Pegs, 
i. Exchange Arrangement with no separate legal tender 
ii. Currency board arrangements 
b)  Soft Pegs 
i. Conventional pegged arrangements 
ii. Stabilized Arrangement 
iii. Intermediate pegs 
1. Pegged exchange rate within horizontal band 
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2. Crawling Peg 
3. Craw-like arrangement 
c)  Floating Arrangements 
i. Floating 
ii. Free Floating 
d)  Other Managed Arrangements. 
Source:  Habermeier, Karl. Annamaria Kokenyne. RomainVeyrune and Harold 
Anderson. (2009), Revised System for Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangement. 
IMF Working Paper. 
 
2.1.1 Hard Peg Regimes 
Frankel (1999) sequences exchange rate regimes in a “flexibility continuum”, 
where hard pegs appear in the most rigid edges of this continuum. Frankel (2003) 
indicates “institutional commitment such as a law mandating a currency board that 
requires a parliamentary supermajority to reverse it” as necessary and sufficient 
condition for hard peg regimes. Additionally as Habermeier et al. (2009) mention 
country authorities’ confirmation to the de jure exchange rate arrangements is required 
in all hard peg regimes. Under hard pegs, two regimes are observed: 
Exchange Arrangement With No Separate Legal Tender:  Under this concept, 
Dollarization and Currency Union Regimes exist. Tavlas et al. (2008) define 
Dollarization or Euroisation, as a country’s acceptance a foreign currency as its legal 
tender by switching local currency with it. In this regime, independent monetary policy 
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must be given up. Habermeier et al. (2009) mention application of this regime introduces 
the complete surrender of the monetary authorities’ control over the domestic monetary 
policy. 
Habermeier et al. (2009) explain Currency (or Monetary) Union regime as member 
countries’ adaptation of a single currency. Multinational central bank determines the 
currency rate and issue banknotes.1European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is 
the most popular example for currency union.2Like Dollarization, in this regime there is 
no existence of independent monetary policy.  
Currency Board Arrangements: In this regime, stated foreign currency at a specified 
rate is used explicitly as a legislative commitment. Central banks are restricted to issue 
banknotes against specified foreign currency, which forces them to forgo some of the 
main activities of central banking such as lender-of-last resort and governance on 
monetary policy. 
There are some debates about the advantages and disadvantages of hard peg regimes in 
the literature. It is generally argued that countries are mainly motivated to choose hard 
pegs since it ensures a stable and credible monetary policy, encourages trade and 
investment by minimizing currency risk, provides a nominal anchor and protects from 
competitive depreciation. 
                                                   
1
 In IMF’s 2009 de facto classification, Monetary or Currency Union Regime is classified under 
arrangement governing the joint currency. Behaviour of the common currency is considered in the new 
classification, which means there is no change in judgment but in description. (Habermeier et al, 2009) 
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Credibility: Yağcı (2001) claims “Institutionally binding monetary arrangements under 
hard pegs tie government’s hands to provide irreversible fixed rates and maximum 
credibility.” Countries can import the monetary policy from an economically strong 
country by fixing their currency to that country’s hard currency aiming to gain 
credibility. Credibility is improved especially in the countries that do not have 
independent central banks. As Mishkin (1998) mentions central banks under the control 
of governments may be obliged to comply political pressure, which may cause a decline 
on the credibility of them and creation of inflationary environment. Under hard peg 
regimes, this risk is minimized with the help of restrictions over central banks in their 
monetary discretion. 
Encouraging Trade and Investment: Frankel (2003) explains that fixing exchange rate 
decreases currency risk over importers and exporters, and therefore triggers international 
trade and investment. Especially, selecting a trade intensive neighbors’ currency 
minimizes transaction cost and increases trade and investment more. 
Provision of Nominal Anchor: Countries facing high inflation can control inflation by 
fixing their exchange rates to a hard currency of a country, which has a powerful 
economy with low inflation rates. Countries with high inflation rates import monetary 
discipline and credibility to reach stability by using the exchange rate as a nominal 
anchor. In addition to this, Mishkin (1998) addresses the time inconsistency problem, 
which emerges from policymakers’ incentives to achieve short-term goals such as higher 
growth and employment rates with discretionary policies, which may be detrimental in 
the long term by increasing inflation rates. This probability is minimized by fixing 
exchange rates and depriving governments from discretionary policies. 
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On the other hand, Frankel (2003) argues that central banks’ commitment to hard 
currency increases their credibility when fighting with inflation in the eyes of the players 
who set the prices and the wages. Consequently, firms set prices and workers desire 
wages considering their low inflation expectations, which aids to achieve lower inflation 
rates. 
Protection from Competitive Depreciation: Frankel (2003) argues that countries can 
depreciate their currencies to gain a trade advantage over their competitors. This beggar-
thy-neighbor policy can be defined as domestic welfare at the expense of neighbors, 
which is attained with foreign retaliation (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). Frankel shows 
severe experiences of East Asia and Latin America countries in 1990s when they tried to 
gain competitive advantage over neighbors by devaluation. Therefore, with fixed 
exchange rates, cooperative solution can be achieved by hindering countries’ 
devaluation probability. 
On the other hand, hard peg regimes contain some drawbacks seen in its 
application. For example, there is almost no discretionary independent monetary policy, 
and a shock transmission from anchor country is easier. In addition to these, shock 
absorption capacity of the hard peg regimes is limited, and in a currency crisis exiting 
from the regime is tough.  
Loose of Independent Monetary Policy: Central banks adopting hard currencies forgo 
their Lender of Last Resort functions, which increases the likelihood of liquidity crisis. 
Bank runs and financial panics cause severe consequences in hard peg regimes because 
of central bank’s inability to finance the commercial banks. Mishkin (1998) indicates 
that central banks under hard pegs cannot respond independently to domestic shocks 
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irrelevant to anchor country. For example, if there is a decline in the domestic demand, 
central bank cannot decrease interest rate, which is tied to interest rates of the anchor 
country. Secondly, especially in Dollarization, countries lose their seigniorage slightly 
less than under currency boards.  
Shock Transmission from Anchor Country: Mishkin (1998) indicates shocks in the 
anchor country can easily be transferred to the pegged country. Frankel (1999) illustrates 
this situation with Argentina example. Federal Reserve’s one basis point increase on 
interest rates affected Argentina’s interest rates more than one basis point when 
Argentina was pegging its currency to dollar. According to the regression results, 
Argentina’s interest rate increased significantly 2.73 basis points, against Federal 
Reserve’s only one basis point increase. 
Difficult Exit Strategies: Exiting from a hard peg regime requires an important 
preparation process. Yağcı (2001) refers pre-condition policies before moving to any 
other regime to avoid from an adverse shock. Exchange rate may be not suitable to 
adjust adverse shock stemmed from the need for more flexible wages, prices and fiscal 
policy. 
Limited Shock Absorption capacity: Countries’ dependences to the anchor country’s 
monetary variables restrict them to cope with shocks by using monetary policies. So 
under hard peg regimes shocks are absorbed by rigorous arrangements in economic 
activities such as wages, prices, production and employment, which may be a painful 
process (Yağcı, 2001). 
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2.1.2 Soft Peg Regimes 
Soft peg regimes appear between the two corners of the flexibility line. In the 
literature, the majority of authors define soft pegs as intermediate regimes. IMF’s 
definition of intermediate regimes as a subcategory under soft pegs does not make 
substantial conceptual difference because all the types of soft peg regimes align between 
hard pegs and floating exchange rates according to their flexibility degree. Soft peg 
regimes can be classified as follows. 
Conventional Peg Arrangements: According to IMF staff Habermeier and his 
colleague’s (2009) definition, under this regime a country pegs its domestic currency to 
a specific currency or a basket of currencies at a fixed rate. The currencies in the basket 
can be chosen from the major trading and financial partners relevant to the trade, service 
or capital flow ratios. The anchor currency or basket ratios are informed to the public or 
IMF. Monetary authorities protect the fixed parity through direct and indirect 
interventions via sale or purchase of foreign exchange rates and via interest rates, 
foreign exchange rate regulations and restrictions, respectively. Empirical confirmation 
of the countries is, to let exchange rate fluctuate within a narrow margins of less than ±1 
% around central rate. Alternatively countries can confirm to maintain the maximum and 
the minimum level of spot exchange rate within a narrow margin of 2% for six months 
at least.23This regime in the literature is known as adjustable peg, which Frankel (2003) 
defines as “fixed but adjustable peg”. The Bretton Woods is the most important example 
for this regime. 
                                                   
2  
 In all soft pegs definitions, Habermeier and his colleagues’ paper (2009)  is used intensively.  
  
11
Stabilized Arrangement:  This regime firstly appears in the IMF’s 2009 classification. 
Country authorities’ commitment is not required under this regime. Spot market 
exchange rate is expected to stay within a 2% margin for six months or larger. There is 
no scope for floating in the margin except step adjustments and specified number of 
outliers. Country can choose a single currency or basket as an anchor, which is 
determined by statistical methods. These statistical criteria must be reached. 
Pegged Exchange Rate Within Horizontal Band: Under this regime, the currency is 
kept within certain margins of fluctuations of at least ±1 % around a fixed central rate, or 
the margin between the maximum and the minimum value of exchange rates exceeds 
2%.34As the band range broadens, this regime approaches to floating exchange rate; 
oppositely as it narrows, it approaches to conventional peg arrangements. Margins are 
announced to the public before adopting the regime with the confirmation of intervenes 
when there is a deviation from the band borders. Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
adopted by European Monetary System (EMS) between 1979 and 1999, with a band 
±2.25 % margins, can be shown as an example for this regime. 
Crawling Peg: Under this regime, there may be adjustments on currency in small 
amounts at a fixed rate, which are usually determined according to past inflation 
differentials vis-à-vis major trading partners or differentials between the inflation target 
and expected inflation5.The arrangements on currency and its rules are informed to the 
public or the IMF. Two methods can be applied in this regime to fight with inflation: 
setting rate of crawl based on changes in the inflation rate which is backward looking, or 
                                                   
3
 Habermeier et al. (2009) 
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setting rate of crawl based on pre-determined fixed exchange rate and/or targeted 
inflation rates which is forward looking. 
Crawl-like Arrangements: Exchange rate is maintained within a narrow margin of 2% 
relative to a statistically identified trend for six months or more. There is no scope for 
floating in the margin except specified number of outliers. Although this regime 
represents similarities to the stabilized arrangement regime, it may require an annualized 
rate of change at least 1%, provided that the exchange rate depreciates in a sufficient 
monotonic and continuous manner. 
In the literature, soft pegs’ advantages and disadvantages are not exactly defined 
because of their existence in the middle of the “flexibility continuum”.  The majority of 
authors indicate the fixed and floating exchange rates and their pros and cons. While the 
majority of authors prefer to explain advantages and disadvantages of soft pegs and hard 
pegs together under fixed exchange rates, some refer advantages and disadvantages of 
only “crawling pegs”. In addition to this, there are views that countries can benefit from 
soft peg regimes if and only if the peg is credible. Shortly the main advantages can be 
ordered as, soft pegs maintain stability and reduce transaction costs and exchange risk 
while providing a nominal anchor for monetary policy (Yağcı, 2001). 
In the last three decades so many countries faced with currency crises (Asian 
Countries, Mexico, Turkey etc.) when they were adopting soft peg regimes. Therefore, 
soft pegs’ sustainability and their vulnerability to crisis began to be queried with the 
“corner hypothesis” in the literature. The authors against this argument exhibit counter 
arguments the “BBC” and the “fear of floating”. All debates are generated from soft peg 
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regimes’ disadvantages, which are overvaluation of exchange rates, excessive volatility, 
excessive tendency of borrowers in foreign currency without hedging   and openness to 
speculative attacks (Frankel, 2003). In addition to these, countries need high level of 
international reserves to defend the currency by intervening in foreign exchange markets 
when the exchange rate goes out of the band boundaries. 
 
2.1.3 Floating Arrangements 
Floating arrangements are the most flexible exchange rates regimes providing 
full discretionary to monetary authorities. The exchange rates are determined by the 
market at the equilibrium point of supply and demand. 
Floating Exchange Rates: Until recent classification of the IMF, this regime was called 
“managed floating with no preannounced path for the exchange rate”. Although 
exchange rate is principally determined in the market and there is no exchange rate 
target, monetary authorities may intervene directly or indirectly to foreign exchange 
market in order to avoid from extreme fluctuations in the exchange rate. Tavlas et al. 
(2008) adds that monetary authorities may aim to reverse long term “misalignment” 
besides preventing undue movements in the exchange rate with intervention, which is 
defined as a continued departure of the exchange rate from perception of its equilibrium 
value. 
Free Floating Exchange Rate: Monetary authorities do not usually intervene in foreign 
exchange market except disorder market conditions. According to definition of  
Habermeier et al.(2009), this regime can be classified as free floating if the authorities 
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confirm that provided with data and information, intervention has existed at most tree 
times in the previous six months with the limit of three business day. Otherwise this 
regime is classified as floating exchange rate regime. 
One of the main advantages of floating arrangements is that it allows a country to 
pursue independent monetary policy. In addition to this, with flexible exchange rate 
regime the economy is more resistant to speculative attacks, shocks are absorbed more 
rapidly and high level of international reserves are not required. 
Independent Monetary Policy: In contrast to the rigid exchange rate regimes, monetary 
policy can be executed by contracting or extending according to the economic 
conjuncture. Monetary policy can be used independently to provide internal and external 
balance. Frankel (2003) indicates that under recessions governments by using 
expansionary monetary policy or depreciation of the currency induce reaching the 
desired level of employment and output level under floating arrangements rapidly. 
Under pegged regimes this process is longer and tougher due to the lack of independent 
monetary policy. 
Secondly, as Frankel (2003) indicates that governments keep two important 
functions of central banking under floating regimes: seigniorage and lender of last resort. 
With lender of last resort function, central banks can bail out the banks, which are in 
liquidity crisis in order to avoid from bank runs and contagion effect. 
Shock Absorption Capacity: Floating arrangements can show resistance to external and 
domestic real sector shocks because the exchange rate finds a new equilibrium rate 
related to the market conditions. Frankel (2003) states floating arrangements play 
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automatic adjustment to trade shocks. Even though the prices and the wages are sticky in 
an economy, the currency provides necessary real depreciation by responding adverse 
development in country’s export markets. 
No Requirement for High International Reserves: Under floating arrangements, central 
banks do not have any exchange rate target and do not intervene in the foreign exchange 
markets except for correction of undue positions of exchange rate. Consequently, central 
banks do not need to hold excessive international reserves. 
There are four main disadvantages of floating arrangements that must be pointed 
out: 
Discouraging Trade and Investment: Uncertainty of the future exchange rate may 
discourage the entrepreneurs from international trades and investment. This argument 
can be rebutted with the existence of global financial instruments providing hedging 
opportunities. 
Inflationary Bias: Central banks’ full monetary discretion may trigger inflation, if they 
do not adopt suitable monetary policies to the economic conditions’ requirements. 
Especially central banks that are not independent tend to apply inflationary biased 
policies with the existence of political pressure. These inflationary biased policies 
stemmed from lack of discipline and political pressures may decrease central banks’ 
credibility and trustworthiness. 
Speculative Attacks: Krugman and Obstfeld (2004) state under floating exchange rate 
regimes speculation on exchange rates, which lead instability, may cause more harmful 
effects on internal and external balances comparing to pegged regimes. The authors 
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explain the mechanism as if exchange traders sell the currency according to their 
depreciation expectations unrelated to the currency’s long-term prospects, others trades 
are triggered by this trend, more and more currency are sold and therefore expectations 
will be realized. 
Uncoordinated Economic Policies: Krugman and Obstfeld (2004) indicate countries 
can harm the world’s economy by applying policies like “beggar-thy-neighbor”, which 
harmed international economics in the interwar period. 
 
2.2 De Jure - De Facto Classification 
Researches in the literature related to exchange rates mostly depend on the 
AREAER published by the IMF.  Until 1999, countries were reporting their regimes 
based on their own classification methods, which is called de jure regime. However 
since 1999, IMF began to publish observed de facto exchange rates in addition to de jure 
regimes, which are based on IMF staffs’ assessment of   the available information (Stone 
et al., 2008). The reason behind this new classification method is the difference between 
the countries’ officially announced regime and the one they actually apply. For instance, 
although some countries announce floating arrangements, they actually adopt crawling 
pegs or intervene frequently in the foreign exchange markets in contrast to the floating 
arrangements’ properties. These behaviors of countries can be explained by Calvo and 
Reinhart’s (2000) the “fear of floating” hypothesis in which countries intervene 
intensively to control the volatility of exchange rates. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003) revise this concept with the “fear of pegging” by indicating some countries 
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follow pegged regimes, but announce floating arrangements in order to protect their 
exchange rate markets from speculative attacks. 
In addition to the IMF’s de facto classification, some authors construct 
alternative coding systems in their studies. In these coding systems, the authors usually 
subcategorize the exchange rate regimes according to their study area. The common 
purposes of these studies are to investigate the performance of alternative regimes and to 
test of the reality of the corner hypothesis (Tavlas et al., 2008). Table 1 represents the 
alternative coding systems used by the authors.  
Reinhart and Rogoff (RR)(2004)
Babula and Otker-Robe (2002)
 Table 1 : Alternative de facto  coding systems
Source: Tavlas, George. Harris Dellas and Alan C. Stockman (2008) “The Classification and performance 
of Alternative Exchange Rate Systems” European Economic Review 52
Bènassy-Quèrè and Coueurè ( BQC) (2006)
Baillliu, Lafrance and Perrault (BLP) (2003)
De Grauwe and Schnabl (DGS) (2005)
Dubas, Lee and Mark (DLM)(2005)
Eichengreen and Leblang (EL) (2003)
Ghosh,Gulde,Ostry and Wolf (GGOW) (1997)
Ghosh,Gulde  and Wolf (GGW) (2002)
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS) (2005)
 
Some of these coding systems (GGOW, Babula and Otker, BLP, EL, DLM, 
GGW and RR) are formed from the mix of the de jure-de facto approaches whereas the 
others (BQC, DGS, and LYS) are formed from pure de facto approaches. Tavlas et al. 
(2008) summarized these coding systems. In GGOW, 136 countries are involved for the 
period 1960-1990. De jure pegged group is divided into two de facto subgroups as 
“infrequent” and “frequent” pegged adjusters according to the frequency of countries’ 
change the announced peg in a year. Babula and Otker revised countries’ description of 
their exchange rates for the period 1990-2001 based on the changes in reserves and 
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official exchange rates. In BLP and GGW coding systems, the de jure coding is 
converted into the de facto with statistical algorithms based on observed exchange-rate 
volatility. BLP covers 60 countries for the period 1973-1998 whereas the GGW covers 
150 countries for the period 1970-1999. 153 countries over the period 1946-2001 are 
employed in RR coding, which is formed with some statistical methods. In addition to 
this, authors describe a different exchange rate “freely falling”, if the countries’ 12 
months inflation rate exceeds 40% and after exchange rate crisis countries change their 
exchange rates from a fixed or quasi-fixed regime to a managed or independently 
floating regime in 6 months. In EL and DLM coding probit-type models are used in 
which the de jure regimes are the dependent variable. The fitted values are accepted as 
the de facto regime. 183 countries’ regimes for the period 1974-2000 are included in the 
LYS coding, which is based on cluster analysis with the aim of capturing the effect of 
intervention in the exchange rate. DGS covers 18 South Eastern European and Central 
European economies for 1994-2004. “Z scores” is used to define the de facto regimes. In 
BQC, regression analysis is used to define implicit basket pegs. 
2.3 HISTORICAL TRENDS IN EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES 
The exchange rate regimes in the world have evolved extensively over the last two 
centuries. Table 2 shows the chronology of exchange rate regimes with an historical 
perspective. 
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** Table is enlarged with the period from 2000 to nowadays. 
2000- ∞: Floating exchange rate regimes by advanced economies, adaptation of single currency (Euro) 
by European Union members, hard pegs and soft pegs by developing countries, soft pegs and floating 
regimes under the “fear of floating” concept by emerging countries.
Table 2: Chronology of Exchange Rate Regimes: 1880-∞
*Source: Bordo, Michael D. (2003). Exchange Rate Regime Choice in Historical Perspective. IMF Working 
Paper WP/03/160
*** The exchange rate choices are shown according to the countries development levels since 1973. 
Emerging markets’ exchange rate choices became more attractive in the beginning of 1990s with the 
increase of the capital mobility.
1880-1914:  Specie: Gold Standard (bimetallism, silver); currency unions; currency boards; floats
1919-1945:  Gold Exchange Standard; Floats; managed floats; currency unions (arrangements); pure 
floats; managed floats
1946-1971:  Bretton Woods adjustable peg; floats (Canada); Dual/ Multiple Exchange Rates
1973-2000:  Floating exchange rate regimes by advanced economies, EMS system by advanced European 
countries, hard pegs and soft pegs by developing and emerging countries
 
The first system used in international monetary system was bimetallism. In a 
bimetallic system, a country’s mint coin stated amounts of gold and silver into the 
nationally unit and the mint commits to change gold and silver with the coin, if it is 
necessary to protect parity (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). The main advantage of this 
system is its ability to reduce price level instability, which may be faced in the usage of 
one metal. For example, cheaper and comparatively abundant silver may become 
dominant form of money when gold becomes to be expensive and scarce in order to 
alleviate the pure gold standard (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). On the other hand, the 
main problem of the system is that the undervalued (silver) metal eliminates the 
overvalued metal (gold) from circulation, which is used as saving device. This system 
was abandoned from the century’s economic leader Britain in the beginning of the 19th 
century with discovery of new gold mines and increase of gold production. Other 
countries followed Britain until there was no country adopting bimetallism in the 
  
20
beginning of the 20th century. After the end of bimetallism, the gold standard was 
adapted all around the world, in which countries were defining their unit of account as a 
fixed weight of gold or alternatively were fixing the price of gold. Consequently, each 
country fixed its exchange rate to the countries adopting the gold standard and became a 
part of the international gold standard (Bordo and Schwartz, 1999). 
In the classical gold standard, gold can be imported and exported freely between 
countries. The world gold stock was allocated according to the countries’ need for 
money and use of substitute for gold (Bordo and Schwartz, 1999). Expansion and 
contraction of money supply were permitted by the monetary authorities according to 
the amount of the imported and exported gold, which provided to countries to hold their 
currency fixed in narrow band. Deviations from the determined currency were corrected 
by arbitrage so that the nations’ currency levels were kept in a line (Bordo and Schwartz, 
1999). The balance of payments’ surplus and deficits were corrected automatically by 
Humean price-specie-flow mechanism, in which changes in domestic prices adjusted 
external trade balance of countries. In the countries with surplus, an increase in the price 
level would decrease the export level and in the countries with deficits, a decrease in the 
price level would increase the export. Bordo and Schwartz (1999) explain that balance 
of payment distortions were corrected with capital flows caused from changes in interest 
rates. In countries with external surplus, there would be a decrease on the interest rate 
related to expansions on money supply whereas in the countries with external deficit 
there would be increase in the interest rates related to the contraction on money supply. 
Therefore, there would be a capital flow from the country with surplus to the country 
with deficit, which was balancing the countries’ balance of payments.  
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Under the gold standard central banks need sufficient gold stocks in order to 
protect the official parity between its currency and gold (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
2004).In addition to this, central banks were supposed to flow “the rules of game” and 
hasten balance of payment arrangements by using their discount rates and other 
monetary policy tools (Bordo and Schwartz, 1999). 
Gold standard was suspended during World War I and governments financed 
their enormous military expenditures by printing money. Governments’ policies to 
finance their expenditures by printing money, increased money supply and price levels 
sharply in turn several countries faced with high inflation (Krugman and Obstfeld, 
2004). Only USA (United State of America) kept adopting the gold standard in the war 
period and other countries let their currencies fluctuate   against dollar. After World War 
I, countries began to adopt the gold standard again but the system was not successful 
because of the restrictions on international trade and payments, prohibitions on private 
financial account transactions, and trade barriers. After the collapse of the system, 
countries could not convert their currency to other countries’ currencies, which forced 
them to settle bilateral or multilateral arrangements for international transactions. 
Consequently, world trade volume contracted. Restrictions over trade and capital 
controls were increased in the early 1930s, inducing disintegrated economy into 
increasingly autarkic national units (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). Countries’ 
realization that they would have been better off with free international trade, which 
could help countries to protect their external and internal balance, provided by 
international cooperation, triggered foundation of the Bretton Woods Agreement 
(Krugman and Obstfeld 2004). 
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Representatives of 44 countries who met in Bretton Woods in July 1944, drafted 
and signed the Articles and Agreements of International Monetary System . The 
representatives were hopeful to design an international monetary system that would raise 
full employment and price stability while letting countries to reach an external balance 
without restrictions on international trade (Krugman and Obstfeld 2004). IMF was 
accepted as the guarantor of international economic system and the other institution 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBDR) was founded to help 
member countries financially in their reconstruction and development expenditures. 
“Adjustable peg” was also accepted as not to face the second gold standard period’s bad 
experiences. According to this exchange rate regime, member countries committed to 
convert their currencies to other currencies and take away trade restrictions. Member 
countries were allowed to give up capital controls. 
In this system, all IMF member countries pegged their domestic currencies 
against the dollar, which was defined as a fixed price of gold (1 ounce= 35 $). U.S was 
responsible for fixing the dollar price of gold and buy dollars against gold at the official 
fixed price from member countries that used to hold their international reserves mostly 
in the form of gold or dollar assets (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). Countries let their 
currencies to move ±1% directions in a band when pegging their currencies to dollar.  
Countries’ obligation to peg their exchange rates to dollar was providing 
discipline to the system because if a central bank except the Federal Reserve would 
increase money supply, it would lose international reserves therefore, it would not be 
able to stay in the system (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). Bad experiences in the 
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interwar period46showed that governments were not reluctant to maintain free trade and 
fixed exchange rates at the price of long  term domestic unemployment. IMF Articles of 
Agreement was prepared to provide countries enough flexibility when reaching external 
balance without sacrificing internal objectives (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). External 
balance was provided in two ways; firstly members contributed with their currencies and 
gold to generate a pool of financial resources so that IMF would help them in need, 
secondly, parities could be adjusted by revaluation or devaluation although the exchange 
rates fixed against the dollar (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). These arrangements could 
be held rarely under in cases of balance of payment problems called “fundamental 
disequilibrium”. IMF permission was required when countries devalue or revalue their 
currencies more than 10%. 
Dollar’s free convertibility property fostered international trade in terms of 
dollar. Therefore, dollar became an international currency, universal medium of 
exchange,  unit of account and store of value (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004).  
Under the Bretton Woods System gold was a nominal anchor, which explains the 
low inflation rates in 1950s and 1960s (Bordo and Schwartz, 1999). However, main 
problem of the system was the credibility because if the growth of gold stock was not 
sufficient to finance the growth of world real output and maintain USA gold reserves, 
the system would become unstable and subject to speculative attacks, in which 
inconsistency between nations’ policies and pegged exchange rates were predicted 
(Bordo and Schwartz, 1999). 
                                                   
4
Great depression exploited in USA in 1929 with the collapse of Stock exchange Market and spread over 
all around the world until 1940s. In this severe period;international trade volume decreased excessively 
and countries faced internal  challenges such as high unemployment levels,  enormous decrease on 
production levels, personal income levels, tax incomes. 
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The system collapsed in 1973 mostly because of the USA balance of payment 
problems. The system was giving the USA more responsibility to hold the value of 
dollar fixed to gold. After the World War II, massive amount of gold flowed in return to 
dollar from European Countries and Japan that needed convertible dollar in their 
reconstructions process, which distorted the USA balance of payment and created dollar 
abundance in the world. In addition to this, monetary expansion of the USA to meet 
military expenditures in the Vietnam War and increased import volumes induced 
becoming the USA dollar liabilities over the gold stock. Other member countries were in 
suspicion of the USA’s ability to hold dollar at fixed rate to gold. Devaluations of dollar 
in 1971 and 1973 were not successful to liquidate the USA balance of payment, and the 
system collapsed. 
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods, countries began to float their currencies. 
Although in the initial years exchange rate regimes were shaped as dirty float with 
central banks’ intense intervention to affect the exchange rates and direction of 
fluctuations, by the 1990’s they were converted to the regimes, in which central banks 
only intervene under necessary conditions to alleviate fluctuations (Bordo and 
Schwartz).In the 1980’s countries challenged with high volatility in both nominal and 
real exchange rates, which in turn decreased macroeconomic stability and increased 
international transaction costs. However, flexible regimes’ ability to mitigate trouble of 
the1970’s oil price shocks and the other shocks in the following years and pegged 
regimes credibility problem stemmed from bad experiences of the Bretton Woods 
outweighed these problems (Bordo and Schwartz, 1999). With bad experiences of the 
Bretton Woods the world’s leading countries were reluctant to be a part of an 
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international exchange rate arrangement, which would restrict them in their internal and 
external balances (Bordo and Schwartz, 1999). Exception to this situation was European 
countries’ desires to generate a monetary union with a common currency. The reason 
behind this can be explained with Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory, which is 
defined by the founder of theory Robert A. Mundell, as “fixed exchange rates are more 
appropriate for areas closely integrated through international and factor movement”.  
Frankel (2003) defines OCA as “a region that is neither so small and open that it would 
be better of pegging its currency to a neighbornor so large that it would be better-off 
splitting into subregions with different currencies”.  The European Monetary System 
(EMS) was established in 1979 by eight European Countries and these countries began 
to adopt mutually pegged exchange rates by letting their exchange rates to fluctuate in a 
±2.25% band relative to an assigned par value (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). The 
system was successful until facing with speculative attacks in 1992 and 1993, which 
forced Italy and Britain to leave the system (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). Bordo and 
Schwartz (1999) show pegged exchange rates, capital mobility and policy autonomies as 
the reason of the collapse of this system. The authors add that countries adopted 
inconsistent policies with their pegs to Deutsche Mark to challenge with speculative 
attacks, although they were seemed to be consistent with the rules. These inconsistent 
practices awakened the suspicions over the system’s credibility, which in turn 
accelerated the collapse of the system.  European countries’ bad experiences with soft 
peg regime in the EMS speeded up to constitute a monetary union infrastructure. In the 
beginning of January 1999 European Union (EU) members began to adopt a single 
currency Euro. Shortly, one part of the advanced economies (USA, Japan) continued on 
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floating exchange rate regimes; the other part (EU) adapted hard pegs to achieve the 
OCA. 
On the other hand, developing and emerging countries applied soft peg and hard 
peg regimes in 1980s and 1990s. Emerging countries with high inflation background 
chose rigid exchange rate regimes to benefit from nominal anchors, which might provide 
economic stability and decrease inflation. In the 1980s and 1990semerging markets 
liberalized their foreign exchange markets to gain from financial integration. Despite the 
gains coming from financial liberalization, countries were exposed to speculative attacks 
under soft pegs. Emerging markets’ common features, financial fragility and lack of 
strong macroeconomic policies prevented countries to defend the currencies under soft 
peg regimes and many of these countries faced with severe currency crisis. Thus, 
currency crises in the last decade of 20th century, with the increase of financial 
integration and the capital mobility, revealed the doubts over pegged regimes. Debates 
were concentered on the sustainability of soft pegs under the “corner hypothesis”, 
caused from majority of crises exploited in countries when they were adopting soft pegs. 
Argentina’s crisis under currency board rebutted this argument partially but this 
hypothesis became a very interesting research area in the economic literature. After the 
crises they faced, many emerging countries began to let their currencies float in the 
beginning of the 21st century but the de facto classification puts them under soft peg 
regimes because their central banks frequently intervene in their foreign exchange 
markets to hold the currencies in line under the “fear of floating” concept. Numbers of 
the de facto exchange rates in 1998 and 2009 in Table 3 show no significant shift 
between the regimes. 
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Today the choice of exchange rate regime is much more complicated as 
compared to the beginning of the twentieth century when all the advanced countries 
joined to the gold standard. Now, there are many options ranging from pure floats 
through many intermediate arrangements to hard pegs. After providing a brief history of 
monetary regimes, in the next chapter the arguments about soft peg regimes will be 
discussed. 
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10 10
Currency Board Arrangement 13 Currency Board Arrangement 13
81
68 45
22
13
3 3
8 5
2 3
Crawl-like arrangements
84
44 39
40 36
n.a.
Total
Source:  Habermeier, Karl. Annamaria Kokenyne. Romain Veyrune and Harold Anderson. (2009), 
Revised System for Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangement. IMF Working Paper.
188 188
75
12
23
78
Table 3: Shares of Classifications Using the 1998 and 2009 Systems, as of April 30, 2008
Managed floating
Independently floating
Floating
Free Floating
1998 de facto system 2009 de facto system
Arrangement with no 
seperate legal tender
Exchange arrangement with 
no seperate legal tender
Conventional fixed peg Conventional pegged 
arrangement
Soft pegs
Hard pegs
Other managed arrangements (residual)
Floating arrangements
Stabilized arrangement
of which: intermediate pegs
Pegged exchange rate within 
horizantal bands
Crawling Peg
Crawling Band
Pegged exchange rate within 
horizantal bands
Crawling Peg
11
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SOFT PEG REGIMES’ SUSTAINABILITY and PERFORMANCE 
 
 
3.1 Arguments About Soft Peg Regimes’ Appearance 
 
3.1.1 The Corner Hypothesis 
The currency crises faced by emerging countries in 1990’s with the increase of 
capital mobility triggered some economists to question soft peg regimes’ sustainability. 
As a critic to the EMS crises in 1992-93, in 1994 Eichengreen came up with the theory 
known as“corner hypothesis”, “vanishing the middle” or “hollowing out of the middle”. 
This hypothesis was adapted to emerging countries after the East Asia crisis in 1997-98 
(Frankel,2003).Fischer (2001) renames the hypothesis as “bipolar view” and claims that 
countries have a tendency to choose either hard peg regimes on the left corner or floating 
arrangement regimes on the right corner of a line in order to escape from the 
unsustainable segment of the line occupied by soft peg regimes. Fisher (2001) illustrates 
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these shifts to the corners with arrangement of the EMU after collapse of the EMS by 
European developed countries, noticeable number of emerging countries’ (Indonesia, 
Korea, Thailand, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia) adaptation of floating exchange rate 
regimes after major currency crises in 1990s and relatively few number of emerging 
countries’ adaptation of hard peg regimes. In addition to these, he indicates the countries 
(South Africa, Israel in 1998, Mexico in 1998 and Turkey in 1998) that did not face any 
currency crisis when they did not adopt any soft peg regimes. 
Fischer (2001) argues that the main reasons of the trend towards the corners are 
soft peg regimes’ crisis-prone property and unsustainability over long periods among the 
countries with open capital accounts. In the literature non-viability of soft peg regimes’ 
is justified with the principle of the Impossible Trinity, the dangers of unhedged dollar 
liabilities and the politically difficult exit strategies (Frankel, 2003). Frankel et al. (2001) 
also investigate soft peg regimes’ verifiability after claiming aforementioned 
explanations are lack of theoretical foundations for the corner hypothesis. 
The first justification is inconsistency of soft peg regimes with the principle of 
the Impossible Trinity. Krugman and Obstfeld (2004) explain the principle of the 
Impossible Trinity as a policy dilemma for open countries. According to this dilemma, 
countries cannot choose all of the three goals- independence in monetary policy, stable 
exchange rate regime and free movement of capital- simultaneously. One of the goals 
should be abandoned.  The authors indicate that in 1994 Mexico and in 1997 East Asia 
were hit by currency crises since they tried to reach three goals at the same time. Capital 
controls’ effectiveness can be investigated under soft peg regimes as an avoidance from 
the policy dilemma under the principle of the Impossible Trinity. Emerging countries 
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adopting soft peg regimes can use capital controls to limit short-term speculative attacks, 
reduce the sensitivity of soft pegs to currency crisis and contagion and protect real 
economy from excessive movements in the exchange rate (Yağcı, 2001). Yağcı (2001) 
shows China, Chile and India as an example of countries that used capital controls 
successfully in order to avoid from 1990s currency crisis contagion, and criticizes East 
Asia to liberalize capital accounts overly rapid before providing financial stability and 
market discipline. Countries can apply control on capital inflows to mitigate the effect of 
short-term speculative attacks or hot money and can apply control on capital outflow to 
avoid from pressures on the exchange rates. 
However, capital controls have some disadvantages. Countries with the controls 
on capital inflows forgo full integration with global markets in turn access of foreign 
savings and other benefits, which can come with integration such as discipline in the 
macroeconomic policies and the financial development. In addition to these, capital 
controls are not effective forever. Countries should not rely on this policy excessively 
and with prudential guidelines they should remove the controls gradually as the 
economy develops and the financial sector strengthens (Yağcı, 2001). Fischer (2001) 
explains that controls on capital outflows cannot protect a currency from devaluation, if 
domestic policies are not consistent with the maintenance of exchange rates so countries 
should give up gradually controls when there is no pressure over the exchange rates. 
These disadvantages and downward effectiveness of capital controls over time create 
uncertainty about their ability to overcome dilemmas faced by countries that adopt soft 
peg regimes stemmed from the principle of the Impossible Trinity. 
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The second justification for unstable soft peg regimes is the danger of unhedged 
liabilities.  Companies and banks may underestimate the likelihood of currency 
devaluation in the future, if government determines a set of exchange rate target. This 
reckless manner leads them not take a hedge position for their foreign currency based 
liabilities (Frankel, 2003). In devaluation domestic currency revenues may not be 
enough to cover their foreign currency based liabilities. Consequently, bankruptcies, 
shut down in real sector and bank fails, difficulties that affect credit lines in financial 
sector may be observed.  
The third justification is the timing problem of governments to abandon the soft 
peg regimes. Governments may have some political concerns about to change economic 
policies in election periods, which may induce some delays in abandoning soft peg 
regimes. Frankel (2003) criticizes Mexico, Thailand and Korea to wait too long until 
reserves ran very low. Consequently, in these countries there was no combination of 
exchange rate and interest rate that could be arranged to alleviate external financial 
constraint and to prevent an internal recession. Beside political reasons recently 
mentioned, countries may find difficult it to exit from soft pegs because an alternative 
anchor is required for monetary and inflation expectations (Yağcı, 2001). 
Frankel (2003) accepts that these arguments- the impossible trinity, the dangers 
of unhedged dollar liabilities and the political difficulty to exit- have some importance 
but do not have enough theoretical background to prove the soft peg regimes’ being 
unstable. Willet (2005:2) agrees with Frankel and adds “mutual adjustment of exchange 
rate and monetary policies allow any degree of exchange rate flexibility to meet unholy 
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trinity constraints as long as monetary policy is adjusted consistently with exchange rate 
policy.” 
Frankel et al. (2001) introduce verifiability notion to investigate the reasons of 
the trend to the corners. Verifiability is market participants’ ability to figure out 
statistically from observed data that the exchange rate is announced or simply it 
represents the transparency and the credibility. The authors argue that regimes, which 
are simple and easily understandable by market participants, are more verifiable. In their 
study, they found Chile was more verifiable before 1992 when she had a narrow band 
and peg to only dollar than the period from 1992 to 1999,when the band was extended 
and currency was pegged to multiple currencies.  
Fischer (2001) indicates the choice of exchange rate regime between hard peg 
regimes and floating regimes is related to the country’s economic characteristics. 
Especially, the country’s inflationary history is very effective in this choice. Countries 
with monetary disorder background, may reach credibility more rapidly and less costly 
under currency boards comparing to the alternative regimes (Fischer, 2001). Fischer 
(2001) gives Argentina as an example for the provision of credibility and success in 
disinflation in the 1990s. On the other hand, Argentina’s recession in 1999-2002 was so 
terrible to outweigh the income gains during the “heydays” of the currency board 
between 1991- 1998 (Frankel, 2003:18). Argentina’s lack of fiscal discipline, fragility in 
the banking system, excessive external debt ratio and especially problems came with the 
currency board adaptation can be counted as the reasons for Argentina’s recession. 
Peso’s movements parallel with dollar induced devastating effect on current account 
balance, which was balanced with capital flows. However, with the East Asia and the 
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Russian Crisis’ contagion effect capital flows to Argentina decreased. Argentina could 
not respond this decrease in the capital flow because the currency board regime hindered 
the usage of independent monetary policy. Consequently, with the Argentina’s crisis 
hard pegs viability attracted doubts. 
Levy-Yeyatiand Sturzenegger (2007) mention the popularity of inflation 
targeting as a nominal anchor under an adaptation of floating exchange rate since the 
beginning of the 21st century. The authors also consider severe experiences of Argentina 
under adaptation of hard pegs and conclude that there is a shift from intermediate 
regimes to only floating regimes. The authors called this trend as the “unipolar view”, 
where floating exchange rates are seen as only durable regimes in financially integrated 
economies.  
Tavlas et al. (2008) gather studies that investigate whether countries have 
tendency to give up adaptation of soft peg regimes. The main challenge of this research 
is the existence of so many coding systems for the exchange rate classifications. Main 
findings for the corner hypothesis are demonstrated in the following table. 
The study of Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf and the study of Babula and Otker show 
similar findings. They both find a decline in the proportion of intermediate regimes 
whereas there are increases in the proportions of hard pegs and floating arrangements. 
However, Bailliui, Lafrance and Perrault’s, Rogoff et al. and Dubas, Lee and Mark find 
no supporting results about the disappearance of intermediate regimes in their studies. 
Shortly, some economists confirm the “corner hypothesis” with their findings, some 
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economists do not. As a result there is no consensus about the “corner hypothesis” in the 
economic literature. 
Authors Sample Coding Results
Decline in shares of intermediate regimes from %84 to% 50
Incease in shares of pure float regimes from %5 to %27
Incease in shares of hard pegs regimes from %12 to %23
Decline in shares of intermediate regimes from %70 to% 40
Incease in shares of  floating regimes %20
Incease in shares of hard pegs regimes  %10
Increase in shares of intermediate regimes from %20 to%45
Increase in shares of floating regimes from %5 to %15
Decrease in shares of pegs from 75% to %40
Table 4: Major findings about the " corner hypothesis"
Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault 
(2003)
1974-1998 BLP coding
Share of intermediate regimes remained at about one half 
between given period.
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002)
150 IMFcountries between 
1975-1999
Six-way De jure 
coding
190 IMFcountries between 
1990-2001
Fifteen Way De 
facto coding
Babula and Otker-Robe (2002)
Source: Tavlas, George.Harris Dellas and Allan C. Stockman (2008) The Classification and Performance of Alternative Exchange Rate 
Systems. Review Paper. European Economic Review.
some movement away from pegs an toward intermediate 
regimes in the 1970s
Dubas, Lee and Mark (2005)
Mid of 1970s-2000s
1970s-1980s
RR five coding
three way 
coding
Rogoff et al (2004)
 
 
3.1.2 The Fear of Floating and the Fear of Pegging 
Calvo and Reinhart introduced the “fear of floating” concept in 2002, which 
mainly can be explained as emerging countries’ reluctances for extreme fluctuations in 
their exchange rates. Lower exchange rate volatility was observed in emerging market 
countries that announce floating exchange rate regimes relative to the developed 
countries such as United States, Japan, Australia that show full commitment to floating 
exchange rate regimes. This asymmetry, although emerging countries are more likely to 
subject to large and frequent terms of trade shocks, motivated the authors to investigate 
the reasons of emerging country monetary authorities’ intentions to stabilize their 
exchange rate by direct or indirect intervention in the foreign exchange markets.  
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Calvo and Reinhart (2002) indicate that emerging countries may be exposed to 
the“fear of floating” concept because of high dollarization ratio stemmed from lack of 
credibility, possible damages in terms of trade, cease of the international access, and 
currency mismatch problems. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) categorize the exchange rate 
regimes as fixed, fear of floating regimes and pure floating regimes, and compare 
determined countries’ exchange rate volatility, interest rate volatility, fluctuations of 
international reserves and commodity prices. The authors base their research on four 
expectations. Firstly, exchange rate volatility of fear of floating countries’ is expected to 
be less than pure floating countries and more than countries adopted fixed exchange rate. 
Secondly, changes in international reserves in fear of floating countries are expected to 
be more than in floating countries and less than in fixed countries. Thirdly, fears of 
floating countries are expected to use interest rates to mitigate the fluctuations of 
exchange rates. Lastly, commodity prices are not expected to vary in fear of floating 
countries as expected to move parallel with exchange rate variations in pure floating 
countries when there is a real shock. At the end of their study Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
obtain consistent findings with their expectations and conclude emerging countries, even 
in normal periods, have tendency to intervene in the foreign exchange rate markets 
directly or indirectly to stabilize their exchange rates.  
In the light of these evidences, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) do not accept the 
disappearance of intermediate exchange rate regimes, but conversely emphasize the 
prevalence of the fear of floating in emerging countries. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) reexamine the “fear of floating” concept 
and find that countries avoid announcing an adaptation of pegged exchange rate regime, 
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although they follow exchange rate policies to stabilize their exchange rate. The authors 
refer to the countries’ stabilization of their exchange rates under announcement of 
floating exchange rate regimes as the “fear of pegging”. Genberg and Swoboda (2004) 
find consistent results with the “fear of pegging” in their study and mention a country 
may have more devastating consequences under economic disturbances if it announces a 
commitment to a pegged exchange rate regime comparing to any other country, which 
stabilizes exchange rate with an announcement of floating exchange rate regime. In 
addition to these, the authors list possible three reasons of the “fear of pegging”. Firstly, 
exchange rate stability can be reached incidentally by monetary policy strategy in which 
a central bank operates and monitors many variables including exchange rate. Secondly, 
a central bank may desire to have discretion in order to react with significant exchange 
rate adjustments when the country faces an idiosyncratic shock. Lastly, a country may 
avoid from an announcement of a parity to eliminate the likelihood of being a target of 
the speculators. 
Alesina and Wagner (2005) investigate the relationship between the countries’ 
departure from announced exchange rate regime and the institutional development. 
Alesina and Wagner (2005) mention the important role of institutions’ to provide a 
commitment and to keep macroeconomic policies consistent with nominal stability. The 
authors find that countries with poor institutions exhibit the fear of pegging whereas 
larger countries with better institutions exhibit the fear of floating. The reason behind the 
countries’ fear of pegging is reconciled by the authors as poor institutions’ association 
with poor economic management and instability. However, countries displaying the fear 
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of floating with good institutions avoid to be seen having a poor economic management 
with wide fluctuations in their exchange rate so they peg their exchange rate. 
Fear of floating concept is usually used for countries’ intention to protect their 
domestic currency from devaluation by interventions. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2007) investigate the characteristics of the exchange rate policies in the 2000s and find 
that countries have tendency to intervene to depreciate or to delay the appreciation of 
local currency. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) call this neo-mercantilist 
approach, which allege that undervalued currency would trigger growth as the “fear of 
floating in reverse” or the “fear of appreciation”. In their study, the authors find 
supporting results for the allegation that undervalued exchange rate stimulates growth 
with an increase in aggregate savings and investment, and a decline in unemployment 
and labor relative to capital compensation. The authors cannot find any relationship 
between growth and boomed export ratios with undervalued currency, as expected. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) differentiate intentions behind the “fear of 
floating” and the “fear of floating in reverse”. They claim that the “fear of floating” 
would be adopted to avoid from financial crisis whereas the “fear of floating in reverse” 
would be adopted to reap from economic welfare. 
 
3.1.3 Basket, Band and Crawl (BBC) Regime 
Williamson (2001) suggests an alternative intermediate regime taking into 
consideration of some countries’ dissatisfaction under floating exchange rate regimes. 
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This regime, which is called Basket, Band and Crawl (BBC) arrangement provides more 
flexible monetary policy comparing to the traditional intermediate regimes. 
Williamson (2001) recommends the basket arrangements for countries with 
diversified trade. He argues that if countries with diversified trade peg their currency to a 
single industrial country’s currency, exchange rate fluctuations of pegged currency may 
induce changes in the countries’ effective exchange rate, and consequently damage their 
macroeconomic balance. Therefore, countries should choose a trade-weighted basket of 
currencies of their major trading partners that may stabilize their effective exchange 
rates. 
Williamson (2001) proposes wider band (up to ±10 % or even ±15 %) motivated 
by four incentives. Firstly, wider bands may provide countries more independent 
monetary discretion, which may be used to correct country’s macroeconomic 
imbalances. Secondly, wider bands may comfort countries when there is an existence of 
strong but temporary capital flows. Thirdly, this regime may prevent countries to be in a 
no-win situation of struggling to defend a disequilibrium exchange rate. Lastly, allowed 
adjustments in the parity consistent with the economic fundamentals may prevent 
provocations in the expectations of discrete exchange rates. Permissions to exchange 
rate to move outside the band temporarily are also recommended in order to protect 
currency from speculative attacks. 
Williamson (2001) criticizes the likelihood of regular crawling pegs, which are 
usually adapted to stabilize the inflation rates, to damage countries’ competitiveness. He 
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suggests that changes in the rate of crawl or occasional small adjustments in parity to 
eliminate this risk by providing necessary real adjustments. 
Williamson (2001) indicates that BBC regime is not an alternative for the 
inflation targeting, but it should be considered as a complement to the inflation targeting. 
Countries should adopt policies to protect both “internal balances” and “external 
balances”. Countries are interested in securing internal balances with inflation targeting 
because of the social reasons especially unemployment levels. On the other hand, 
reserves are used to finance short-run imbalances to protect external balances. Internal 
balance can be provided continually when an external balance is achieved. Williamson 
(2001) points out that BBC regime’s objective is to secure external balance in the 
medium term under “fundamental equilibrium exchange rate” (FEER).  
 Williamson argues in his study that the East Asian crisis could have been 
avoided, if these countries had managed BBC regime. Singapore is shown as a 
successful example of BBC regime follower since the 1980s. Singapore chooses a 
basket, which contains weighted ratio of the currencies of the fundamental trading 
partners and allows exchange rate to move within bands. Government does not disclose 
the currency basket, central rate and bands. The crawl of the nominal exchange rate 
regime is used to mitigate the differences between the domestic and the foreign inflation 
rates (Wang, 2008). 
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3.2 Performance of Soft Peg Regimes 
3.2.1 Inflation 
Rigid exchange rate regimes (soft pegs and hard pegs) are expected to provide 
lower inflation rates. Countries with high inflation backgrounds may adopt a pegged 
exchange rate regime as a nominal anchor to achieve monetary discipline and credibility, 
thereby decrease the inflation rates. On the other hand with full discretionary of 
monetary authorities, higher inflation levels may be expected under floating exchange 
rate regimes, especially in emerging countries. The distinction of performance under 
different exchange rate regimes in advanced and emerging countries should be done 
since emerging countries have specific characteristics. Calvo and Mishkin (2003) order 
these common features as weak fiscal, financial and monetary institutions; currency 
substitutions and liability dollarization; and sensitivity to sudden stops. The first three 
features may cause inflation or induce to difficulties when fighting with the inflation. 
Fiscal policies far from responsibilities may compel the monetary authorities for the debt 
monetization, which may produce rapid money growth, high inflation and depreciation 
pressure over the exchange rates. Weak financial systems without strong regulations and 
supervisions may induce damages on the bank’ balance sheets so the monetary 
authorities are restricted to raise the interest rates in order to fight with the inflation. In 
addition to this, banking system fragility may lead high inflation rates and devaluations 
through fiscal instability since governments need to bail-out the banks. Monetary 
authorities may not be able to control the inflation rates and protect the currency from 
large depreciations, when there are weak monetary institutions and dependent central 
banks with little commitment to the price stability (Calvo and Mishkin,2003). Ghosh, 
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Gulde and Ostry (1996) argue that policymakers may maintain pegged regimes as an 
anti-inflationary tool with two main reasons. These are pegged regimes’ provision of the 
political discipline with visible commitment and the confidence on exchange rates. 
Soft peg regimes’ appearance between hard pegs and floating arrangements do 
not serve a clear perception about the performance with inflation. There are some views 
that soft pegs are beneficial for the countries if only if the peg is credible. 
Tavlas et al. (2008) indicate that pegged exchange rate systems are reconciled 
with lower inflation rates in much of the literature. Still these empirical studies are not 
exactly consistent with each other because of the usage of number of different coding 
systems. In these empirical studies, some economists prefer to investigate soft pegs and 
hard pegs under one category whereas some prefer to investigate soft pegs’ under 
separate category from hard pegs.  Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002) search the 
relationship between the inflation and the exchange rate regimes between 1970 and 1999 
by dividing regimes into three categories: pegged regimes (hard pegs and traditional 
pegs), intermediate regimes (floating within a predetermined range) and floating 
regimes. Either they use their own coding or the de jure coding, they find that pegged 
regimes have lower inflation level and are followed by intermediate and floating regimes 
respectively. When they elaborate their search based on the countries’ income levels 
(upper-income, upper-middle income and low and lower middle income), they observe 
that upper- middle income and lower-middle income countries can achieve lower 
inflation rates under pegged exchange rate regimes. On the other hand, floating regimes 
perform the best in upper income countries to reach lower inflation rates and followed 
by intermediate regimes and pegged regimes respectively. Rogoff et al.(2003) 
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investigate the relationship between the exchange rate regimes and the macroeconomic 
variables in the period of 1970 to 1999 with the usage of the de facto classification. They 
categorize countries based on the macroeconomic and the financial development as 
developing countries, emerging markets and advanced countries. Their findings show 
that developing countries with relatively low exposure to international capital flows can 
reach lower inflation levels with rigid regimes (pegged and intermediate regimes), which 
provide them enhanced policy credibility, and advanced countries meet faster growth 
rates without facing higher inflation rates under floating regimes. On the other hand, 
neither rigid regimes nor floating regimes provide remarkable gain for emerging markets 
in terms of inflation rates. In addition to this, both regimes have some adverse effects on 
the emerging markets, which are highly open to the international capital flows. When 
rigid exchange rate regimes are associated to “twin crisis”, which includes financial 
sector crisis and balance-of payment turbulence, floating regimes are associated with 
large fluctuations in exchange rates. 
In conclusion, although it is accepted that hard peg regimes may provide best 
solution for developing countries in terms of inflation, and floating regimes provide the 
best for advanced economies, there is no consensus about soft pegs regimes’ 
performance in terms of inflation.  The reasons behind this may be existence of soft peg 
regimes’ in the middle of the flexibility continuum. Generally, soft peg regimes’ 
performance in terms of inflation is lower than hard pegs in developing countries, lower 
than floating regimes in advanced countries. On the other hand, none of the exchange 
rate regimes show superiority in terms of inflation for emerging markets. However, 
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another nominal anchor inflation targeting under floating exchange rate regimes 
provides lower inflation rates for emerging markets. 
3.2.2 Growth Rates 
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (1996) indicate exchange rates may affect growth rates 
through investment and increased productivity. The authors argue that pegged exchange 
rates are expected to increase the investment by diminishing the uncertainties of policies 
and decreasing the interest rates. On the other hand, pegged exchange rates impair 
efficient allocation of resources among sectors, misguide price signals, and stimulate 
protectionist pressure through removing important adjustment mechanism. Ghosh and 
Ostry (2009) specify that the intermediate regimes have best growth performance by 
achieving best balance between the pegged and the floating exchange rate regimes. 
Appearance of both the conventional pegs, which are close to the rigid corner and the 
intermediate pegs, which are more flexible under soft peg regimes, restrict to achieve a 
certain comment of soft pegs’ performance in the growth rates. Tavlas et al. (2008) 
collect empirical findings about this relationship. Although half of these studies show 
that the intermediate regimes grow faster than the other regimes, the other half of the 
studies do not support these findings. 
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Authors Coding Results
Source: Tavlas, George. Harris Dellas and Allan C. Stockman. (2008) The Classification and 
Performance of Alternative Exchange Rate Systems. Review Paper. European Economic 
Review.
Their own codes
De Grauwe and Schnabl 
(2005)
Pegs grew faster than flexible 
regimes
Table 5: Major findings about the relationship between growth and exchange rates
Bailliu, Lafrance and Perrault 
(2003)
BLP coding
Floating regimes are associated with 
the highest growth rates
Their own codes
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003)
Floating regimes are associated with 
the highest growth rates
Intermediate regimes grow faster 
than other regimes
Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2002)
Dubas, Lee and Mark (2005)
RR five coding
RR five coding
Their own codes
Intermediate regimes grow faster 
than other regimes
Intermediate regimes grow faster 
than other regimes
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
Rogoff et al (2004)
Their own codes
Intermediate regimes grow faster 
than other regimes
 
 
3.2.3 Output Volatility 
Output volatility is expected to be lower under floating exchange rate regimes, 
which have shock absorber capacity, and provides the authorities a monetary discretion. 
Tavlas et al. (2008) indicate that in the literature there are consistent empirical results 
with this expectation and the growth volatility increases as the flexibility of exchange 
rate decreases. As empirical results support, intermediate regimes’ performance are 
expected to be lower than floating exchange rate regimes’ but higher than pegged 
exchange rate regimes’ in terms of output volatility. 
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Authors Results
4.3% under pegs
4.0% under intermediate  regimes
3.4% under floating regimes
Free falling regimes* have highest volatility
pegged regimes have second highest volatility
free floatings have lowest volatility
* Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) discriminate the countries with annual inflation rates 
above 40% and classify them under “freely failing”. The authors accept that this 
macroeconomic imbalance may harm the possible effects of the exchange rate 
Edwards and Magendzo (2006)
Dollarised economies are associated with 
higher growth volatility than other regimes.
Similar results with Rogoff et al. (2004)
Table 6: Major findings about the relationship between output volatility and 
exchange rate regimes
Rogoff et al (2004)
Bleaney and Fielding (2002)
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003)
Source: Tavlas, George. Harris Dellas and Allan C. Stockman. (2008) The 
Classification and Performance of Alternative Exchange Rate Systems. Review 
Paper. European Economic Review.
 
 
3.3 SOFT PEGS’ SENSITIVITY TO CRISES 
In the 1990s and 2000s, many emerging country experienced severe currency 
crises under adaptation of soft peg regimes with the climb of the international capital 
flows. In the literature, soft peg regimes vulnerability for currency crisis is usually 
associated with the currency misalignment concept and the speculative attacks. Soft peg 
regimes are also criticized to be more prone for liability dollarization and sudden stops. 
However, none of the currency crisis faced in these years should be talked independently 
from the macroeconomic and financial development of countries. Yağcı (2001) indicates 
the importance of strong financial and economic policies to defend the soft pegs and, 
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adds the need of consistency of the macroeconomic policies with the maintenance of the 
exchange rate. Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2003) state that “twin crises”, where banking 
sector crisis and currency crisis appear together, has been faced under rigid regimes by 
mostly emerging countries. Frequent existences of “twin crisis” in emerging countries 
under rigid regimes comparing to developing and advanced economies are associated 
with the fragile financial sectors of emerging countries. Calvo and Mishkin (2003) 
mention that emerging countries should have strong institutions, which provide fiscal, 
financial and macroeconomic stability to gain macroeconomic success and to avoid from 
currency crisis.  
In the following sub-sections, the concepts associated with soft pegs’ 
vulnerability to crisis will be investigated in the light of financial fragility. 
 
3.3.1 Currency Misalignments 
Calvo and Mishkin (2003) define the misalignment concept as “a sizable 
difference between currency’s actual level and the one to which “fundamentals” would 
dictate”. Misalignment in emerging countries may damage the current account balance 
with unsustainable trade deficit or undesirable surplus, and may lessen economic growth 
in the medium and long run (Yağcı, 2001). Many economists accept continuous 
overvaluation as a powerful warning for currency crisis.  
Coudert and Couharde (2008) mention the difference of inflation rates between 
the country and nominal anchor cause real appreciation in rigid exchange rates. If 
inflation falls only gently after adaptation of a peg, there will be real appreciation in the 
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currency. Real appreciation of currency increases the import and decreases the exports 
by damaging external competitiveness of a country under a pegged regime. 
Calvo and Mishkin (2003) state that countries can arrange the effective real 
exchange rates by applying taxes and subsidies on imports and exports. The same 
amount of tax on imports and subsidies on exports can be chosen parallel to real 
depreciation. This tax-and-subsidy fiscal devaluation has an advantage over nominal 
devaluation up to some level, which triggers inflation. High levels of taxes may lead 
importers for tax evasion. However, the authors add that to implement a fiscal 
devaluation effectively and in right time is difficult without well-run fiscal institutions. 
Yağcı (2001) emphasizes that the soft peg regimes provide stable and 
competitive exchange rates only if a sustainable level is set consistent with the economic 
fundamentals. In addition to this, the authorities should persuade the market to keep 
currency at that level with disciplined macroeconomic policies and credible institutions. 
Nevertheless, elimination of misalignment cannot be assured in the countries open to 
international capital flows. Yağcı (2001) indicates that countries’ poor fiscal and 
monetary policies, real external and domestic shocks may lead to misalignments and 
currency crisis under soft pegs. Impact of policy mistakes enlarges with the open capital 
flows. In order to reduce current account deficit stemmed from overvalued currency, 
higher interest rates or financial contraction are required. Political concerns in a country 
may lead the authorities to respond with required arrangements lately or inadequately. 
With increased uncertainty, large capital outflows and rapid decline in international 
reserves are observed. Finally this country cannot defend the peg anymore and has a 
currency crisis with devastating effect, if the financial sector is also subjected to foreign 
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exchange rate risks. Yağcı (2001) refers the likelihood of contagion of currency crisis to 
other countries in an increasingly integrated global economy. On the other hand, 
intermediate regimes (BBC arrangements) may be less sensitive to misalignments than 
soft pegs, if the authorities allow the exchange rate to move outside of the band. The 
reason behind this is the intermediate regimes’ provision of scope for determining a 
suitable balance between exchange rate stability and flexibility (Yağcı, 2001). 
 
3.3.2 Speculative Attacks 
Soft peg regimes may be target for one-way speculative bets. In a downward 
pressure for currency, central bank defends the currency by intervening in the foreign 
exchange market. Purchasing the domestic currency against its international reserves 
may relieve foreign exchange markets in the short run. However, in the long run 
reserves would be eroded and a serious depreciation would flow this erosion. 
Speculators know this process, and they may lead the direction of any significant change 
in exchange rates (Angkinand, Chiu and Willett, 2006). Yağcı (2001) indicates that 
under self-fulfilling expectations speculative attacks may generate currency crisis, 
although the country has strong economic fundamentals. If a large player takes a short 
position of domestic currency with depreciation expectations, the other player will 
follow him/her. Consequently, central bank is forced to abandon the currency if the 
government is reluctant to increase interest rates or hold other cautions, which are costly. 
Disastrous result, collapse of currency would accelerate the inflation. 
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On the other hand, the risk of speculative attacks is lower under both hard peg 
regimes and floating regimes. In hard peg regimes, loss in reserve induce a monetary 
contradiction and higher interest rates, which stabilize the runs on currency, and in 
floating regimes, flexibility and lack of commitment to defend any determined rate or 
band present two-way bets for speculators, which lessens the risk of speculative attack 
and its contagion effect (Yağcı, 2001). Yağcı (2001) adds that both floating regimes and 
hard peg regimes may be subjected to the speculative attacks under some conditions. If a 
country has many debts based on foreign currency, expectations for depreciation of 
currency increases in which debt holders will not be able to complete their obligation. 
Eventually under this self-fulfilling crisis considerable capital flight is occurred, and 
expectations of depreciation are realized. In a liquidity crisis, countries under both 
floating and hard peg regimes face with currency crisis. In a hard peg, limited lender of 
last resort role of a central bank prevent the banks bail-out, in turn liquidity crisis will 
affect output and employment adversely and central bank give up hard peg regime. In a 
floating regime, market players’ anticipation about bailouts the banking system with 
pressure on prices and exchange rates would cause capital flights (Yağcı, 2001). 
There are also debates about, which kinds of soft peg regime are more vulnerable 
to speculative attacks. Angkin and, Chiu and Willett (2006) argue that although 
adjustable pegs (conventional pegs) are very prone to the speculative attacks, more 
flexible intermediate regimes are less prone to the speculative attacks. The authors 
reconcile the success of protecting currency from speculative attacks with well-managed 
crawling pegs. Yağcı (2001) explains that in conventional pegs the authorities are 
obligated to keep the currency by interventions within the band, which may induce 
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speculative attacks if the band is not perceived credible and defensible. On the other 
hand, relatively wider bands and temporary permission for currency to move outside the 
band avoid one-way bet of speculative attacks. Nevertheless, this description 
accommodates better to Williamson’s BBC arrangements than IMF’s intermediate 
regimes definition. 
 
3.3.3 Sudden Stops and Liability Dollarization 
Sudden stops can de defined as reversal of the capital inflows. Sudden stops have 
been usually observed in emerging markets in the period of the financial crisis. Current 
account deficit, which is offsetby capital inflows must be compensated by reserves, if 
capital inflows dry. This decreases the international reserves. In rigid regimes, reserve 
losses lead to central banks to abandon pegging and depreciate the domestic currency. 
Calvo and Mishkin (2003) state the depreciation and sudden stops may induce large 
shifts in relative prices, imbalances in income distribution and harmful effect on wealth. 
There are so many reasons for sudden stops. If  countries’ pegs are not perceived as 
credible, creditors began to withdraw their capitals. Not only suspicions on the currency 
but also suspicions of the countries’ fiscal and financial instability may trigger a sudden 
stop.Yağcı (2001) orders the possible motivators for sudden stop as real and perceived 
policy mistakes, terms of trade and productivity shocks, weaknesses in the financial 
sector, liability dollarization and political instabilities. 
Developing and emerging countries’ inability to borrow in their own currencies 
is called   “original sin”. Countries’ ill-advised economic policy backgrounds and their 
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lack of complete compatibility to the global capital markets are shown as the main 
reasons of “original sin” (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2004). Original sin leads countries to 
borrow usually based on Dollar or Euro. As the countries’ liability dollarization 
increases, their sensitivity for shocks increases. In depreciations, debt holders whose 
incomes are usually based on domestic currency would not be able to pay their debts. 
Overall result for the economy would be very severe with many bankruptcies, loan 
defaults, sharp decline in lending and an economic contradiction (Calvo and Mishkin,  
2003). Liability Dollarization is more dangerous for the relatively closed economies in 
which earnings are in domestic currency. 
Liability dollarization is a problem for all exchange rate regimes. It may induce 
lack of credibility for countries in the international markets, capital reversals and sudden 
stops. After the depreciation of the currency, liability dollarization would also lead 
liquidity crisis, especially if the banking system is not strong. The defender of the 
“corner hypothesis” claim that soft pegs regimes are more prone to the crisis stemmed 
from liability dollarization, because these regimes prevent banking sector and real sector 
players to take precautions. With previously determined bands, financial sector and real 
sector players may feel themselves more confident and do not need to take  hedge 
positions for their liabilities. At this point, financial sector regulations should be 
considered.Calvo and Mishkin (2003) explain that governments’ financial regulatory 
policies affect the ratio of liability dollarization. Banking regulations can be arranged to 
decrease the currency mismatch in the balance sheets of banks. Matching up foreign-
denominated liabilities with foreign-denominated assets may decrease the currency risk. 
However, this regulation for banking system may be ineffective to reduce the risk, if the 
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banks’ assets are the loans to companies who are unhedged. If the companies arenot able 
to pay their loans to the banks, banking system would inevitably face with liquidity 
crisis. Consequently, governments not only  should apply regulations for banking system 
but also should discourage the real sector for liability dollarization or borrowing 
unhedged foreign currency denominated debt (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003). Calvo and 
Mishkin (2003) compare Argentina and  Chile when they both experienced sudden stop 
after the 1998 Russian crisis, and they indicate that Chile was less affected because 
liability dollarization was lower resulted from stronger fiscal, financial and monetary 
institutions. 
 
3.3.4 Empirical Studies 
The earliest study for comparing different exchange regimes’ crisis sensitivity 
was held by Babula and Otker-Robe in 2003. Babula and Otker (2003) investigate the 
frequency of crisis under different exchange rate regimes adopted by IMF member 
countries between 1990 and 2000. The authors define the crisis period as if determined 
thresholds for exchange market pressure index, interest rate increases and weighted 
average of exchange rate depreciation are exceeded. In their study, not only purpose they 
to find the different exchange rate regimes’ crisis vulnerability, but they also purpose to 
test the corner hypothesis. As aforementioned in the previous section about the corner 
hypothesis, they find supporting results for the corner hypothesis. They observed more 
frequent crisis episodes under soft pegs regimes in that period. However, they add that 
none of the poles of the regime spectrum are free from crisis. In addition to these, they 
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find that conventional pegs are more prone to the crisis comparing the other intermediate 
regimes, although there is no statistically significant difference between different 
intermediate regimes for crisis sensitivity. Angkinard, Chiu and Willet (2006) criticize 
Babula and Otker-Robe’s study about three issues. These are usage of unusual crisis 
dates, lack of consideration of changes in reserves and the problems of classifying 
exchange rates. In their study, the authors aim to see if Babula and Otker-Robe’s results 
are consistent with other crisis measures and different classification methods such as 
regime classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003). They find no supporting result for the corner hypothesis, but they find that 
exchange rate regimes in the center of spectrum are the most crisis prone regimes. In 
addition to these, when they enlarge their study based on the countries development 
level, they find intermediate regimes being prone to crisis are more prevalent in 
emerging countries. In contrast to the Babula and Otker-Robe’s findings, they find 
substantial differences in being prone to crisis between different intermediate regimes 
(Angkinard, Chiu and Willet, 2006). 
Cudert and Couharde (2008) investigate if pegged regimes are more prone to the 
overvaluations. They examine 128 countries’ misalignments by estimating real 
equilibrium exchange rates from 1974 to 2004. They find that pegged exchange rate 
regimes are more prone to the overvaluation both in the de facto classification of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003).  
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3.4 Conclusion 
Due to globalization and large capital mobility throughout the world, the 
importance of choosing the appropriate exchange rate regime has increased in the last 
thirty years. Major currency crises in the 1990s have also intensified the debate about the 
costs and benefits of various exchange rate regimes. Although there is no consensus 
among economists, a growing number of researchers agree on the view that there is no 
single ideal exchange rate regime that is appropriate for all countries. 
This study provides a review of the recent debates about soft peg regimes 
sustainability and their performance. The main difficulty that economists face is the 
existence of so many coding systems for exchange rate regimes. Although IMF’s de 
facto classification is generally accepted by the majority of economists, some prefer to 
use their own classification method. In some coding systems conventional pegs and hard 
pegs are categorized under fixed exchange rate regime whereas the other soft peg 
regimes are categorized as intermediate regimes, which complicate the assessment of 
soft peg regimes’ performance and sustainability clearly. This study is based on the 
IMF’s recent classification system. Although the concept of soft peg regime covers both 
more rigid conventional pegs and relatively flexible intermediate regimes, soft peg 
regimes and intermediate regimes are used as synonymous. 
In the beginning of the 21st century, the hypothesis of gradual disappearance of 
soft peg regimes became popular. The currency crises countries faced under soft peg 
regimes and the trend of countries’ choice towards the corners of flexibility continuum - 
mostly to the flexible corner- formed the main arguments of the corner hypothesis. 
Although none of the exchange rate regime is proved to be innocent for the currency 
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crises, the majority of empirical studies show that soft peg regimes are more prone to the 
currency crises.  
On the contrary to the corner hypothesis, intermediate regimes are adopted by 
many country secretly under the announcement of floating exchange rate regimes. The 
countries with an unannounced, hidden exchange rate target avoid from speculative 
attacks, which is more prevalent under soft peg regimes and hold the exchange rate in 
that hidden target by frequently intervening in the foreign exchange rate market like in 
the intermediate regimes. Under the arguments support each other the “Fear of Floating” 
and the “Fear of Pegging” countries both keep their full monetary discretionary and 
control exchange rate movements.  
On the other hand, countries’ sensitivity to currency crisis should not only be 
evaluated with their exchange rate regimes choices. Countries financial, fiscal and 
economic institutions’ strength affects the stability of all macroeconomic variables, 
including exchange rates. The reality that greatest majority of currency crises under soft 
peg regimes were faced by emerging countries without strong, developed financial 
institutions should not be ignored. Real country examples show the importance of 
institutional framework and sound fiscal and financial structure to provide strong 
macroeconomic balances including the exchange rate regime. Banking system plays 
very important role to provide strong economic balances because banking system 
directly affects the real sector by credit mechanism and has an intermediary role for 
savings and investments.  Consequently, strong banking system is one of the main pillar 
for a strong economy. To provide a sound banking system, there should be effective 
regulatory framework on the banking system. Emerging countries, which faced with 
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currency crisis under soft peg regimes did not have sound banking system and regulatory 
frameworks. Indeed nearly all these countries faced with banking system crisis after a 
currency crisis.  
In conclusion; although the appearance of soft peg regimes seems to be vanished 
from the perspective of countries’ exchange rate choices, their hidden applications by 
countries seem to be continuing and their vulnerability to crises should be analyzed with 
considering emerging countries’ lack of strong financial and fiscal structure. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CRISES EXPERIENCES OF EMERGING COUNTRIES UNDER 
SOFT PEG REGIMES 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the 1990s so many emerging country adopted soft peg regimes, usually to 
fight with the high inflation ratios. Although most of them managed to decrease inflation 
ratios, they could not have escaped from the crises. General problems faced by countries 
were aforementioned dangers stemmed from the soft peg adaptation such as 
overvaluation, liability dollarization, and speculative attacks. Most of these countries 
had to float their currencies after they faced with speculative attacks because there was 
no way to defend the currency. In addition to the disadvantages came with adaptation of 
soft peg regime, these emerging countries generally did not have good macroeconomic, 
financial and fiscal appearance. Emerging countries have similar characteristics like lack 
of regulatory framework in financial area, high public deficit, high current account 
deficit, unsound banking system, lack of corporate governance and political  
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uncertainties. Their unsound appearance decreased the credibility of them in the eyes of 
the creditors in the international financial markets, which caused sudden stops and 
speculative attacks. Generally, these emerging countries faced with banking crisis with 
the currency crisis because of their highly liability dollarized banking systems and bank 
runs stemmed from confidence depletion of residents. On the other hand, before facing 
with the crises so many emerging countries were successful on fighting with inflation. In 
short, although emerging countries benefited from the advantages of soft peg regimes, 
they lived crises and abandoned their peg.  
In this chapter four countries are chosen as example. They both adapted rigid 
exchange rate regimes and at the end they both faced with currency crises stemmed from 
various reasons and let their exchange regime float. The crises will be investigated in 
chorological order in the following part. The first country is Mexico. Mexico faced a 
severe balance of payment crisis in 1994 stemmed from speculative attacks with the 
confidence depletion of investors, who kept suspicions over Mexico’s high current 
account deficit, high debt ratio, weak financial structure and political uncertainty. 
Second example, 1997 East Asian Crises has different characteristics. In this example, a 
region is held as an example, because nearly all the countries in this region faced with 
the crisis in a very short period, because of similar reasons and contagion effect. In this 
region, some countries adapted soft peg regime, some adapted hard peg regimes. 
However, general appearance of this region was adaptation of rigid regimes. The East 
Asian countries faced financial crises stemmed from speculative attacks with the 
confidence depletion of international investors, who kept suspicions over the East Asian 
countries fragile banking systems, weak financial structure, continuously increased debt 
structure and political uncertainties. 1999 Brazil Balance of Payment crisis follows this 
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severe crisis. In this crisis, the contagion effect of the East Asian Crises and the 1998 
Russian crisis played very important role. Brazil like other countries faced with the 
speculative attack. In a short period continuously increased public debt, current account 
deficit and political uncertainties attracted the attention of investors, who had little 
confidence to emerging countries after the Mexico, the East Asian and the Russian 
crises. Last country example is from Turkey. Turkey faced a severe financial crisis in 
2001. Like previously aforementioned countries Turkey faced the speculative attacks 
and had to abandon the peg. The main reasons attracted the international investor in this 
case was weak financial structure, fragile banking system, unsustainable debt structure 
appearance and political uncertainties. To categorize, where Mexico and Brazil faced 
balance of payment crises, Turkey and The East Asian countries faced financial crises 
after speculative attacks. Except Brazil, all the countries had weak financial structure. 
However Mexico crisis is not usually categorized as a financial crisis because main 
reasons attracted the speculative attack were debt structure, unsustainable current 
account deficit and political turbulence. 
Mexico’s and Brazil’s current account deficits were perceived as unsustainable 
and they faced balance of payment crises with sharp currency devaluation. Mexico faced 
nearly its’ all foreign reserves, where Brazil lost half of its reserves in very short time as 
usually observed in the balance of payment crises. These countries were attracting high 
amount of capital inflow and they were financing their current account deficit with these 
inflows. So sustainability of the current account was very important for them. Some 
indicators can be counted as showing sustainability of current account. Corsetti, Pesenti 
and Roubini (1998) counts these indicators as, investment and saving ratios, productive 
efficiency, inflation, political stability, composition and size of capital inflow, foreign 
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exchange reserves etc. They indicate that because current account balance is the 
difference between national saving and investment, the reason behind the deficit may be 
either a fall in saving or an increase in investment. Borrowing from abroad if it is 
channeled to productive, efficient investments projects is less dangerous than decrease 
on saving, which means increase on consumption. The other indicator inflation plays an 
important role in rigid exchange rate regimes adaptation. Domestic higher inflation rates 
lead to real appreciation of the fixed currency, which cause deterioration on trade 
balance. Political instability may cause balance of payment if the general 
macroeconomic appearance of the country is not strong, because the threat of a change 
in regime which is not committed to a sound macroeconomic policy may distort the 
confidence of the investors and their willingness to finance current account deficits 
(Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini1998). The other indicator is foreign reserve. Adequately 
higher financial reserves more than short-term debt may provide confidence to investors, 
who invest in the countries for short periods. In addition to these, the structure of the 
capital inflow plays very important role in sustainability of the current account. If the 
ratio of the foreign direct investment is high, this means the probability of facing sudden 
stop decreases and the foreign debt goes to the investments as mentioned in investment 
and saving indicator (Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 1998).  
The East Asian countries’ and Turkey’s weak financial system supported with 
some imbalances in macroeconomic area and political uncertainties attracted the 
investors’ attention. In addition to these, both countries faced so many defaults in the 
banking system. Mishkin (1998) counts two ways that weaknesses in the banking sector 
cause financial crises and three main relations between financial crises and currency 
crises.  
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First way, deterioration of the balance sheets of the banks especially maturity 
mismatch may restrict the banks’ lending ratio. These restrictions of lending may limit 
the real sector’s activity. Second way, the deterioration of the balance sheets of the 
banks would also restrict the central bank to use its instruments, especially interest rates. 
An increase on the interest rates to avoid from depreciation of the currency may harm 
the bank’s balance sheets if maturity mismatch ratio is high. In these situations, central 
banks avoid to increase the interest rates. Investors, who observed the weak banking 
sector, assume that the central bank has limited ability to defend the currency so that 
they began to withdraw their hot money (Mishkin, 1998).  
In addition to these; Mishkin (1998) constitutes three main relations between a 
currency crises and financial crises. Currency crises generate a sharp devaluation of the 
currency. First of all, this devaluation firstly deteriorates the firms’ balance sheets, 
especially if their liability structures   depend on foreign currency, when their incomes 
are domestic currency based. This would decrease the net worth and if the banks do not 
monitor the firms adequately, the ratio of unqualified credit would increase with 
asymmetric information. Secondly, after a sharp depreciation the increase on interest 
rates again brings interest debt burden on the firms. Lastly, devaluation would harm the 
balance sheet of the banks. If the banks’ liability structures depend on short-term based 
foreign debt, the banks would go to the liquidity crises. Their inability to gather credits 
from the insolvent firms would harm the banks more.  These dangers can be prevented 
by strong regulatory and supervisory framework, which would restrict the banks with 
required rules and sanctions and good monitoring capacity (Mishkin, 1998).  
In the following sections aforementioned countries, their crisis periods and the 
main reasons behind the crises they faced will be investigated in detail.  
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4.2 1994 Mexico Crisis And Its Reasons 
4.2.1 The Crisis Period 
In 1985 Mexican government began series of reforms after living with high 
inflation levels and stagnant economy for long years. First of all, government liberalized 
the trade sector. An economic stabilization plan followed this process in 1987 with new 
market-oriented institutions (Gil-Diaz, 1998). The main pillars of the stabilization 
program were a fundamental opening of the economy to international competition, a 
strong privatization and deregulation process, a stabilization program based on a 
predetermined nominal exchange rate anchor with restricted fiscal and monetary policy 
support, a radical debt restructuring and, a broad social and economic agreement 
between government, the private sector and labor unions (Edwards, 1997). 
One of the main features of these reforms was choice of exchange rate regime, 
which was used as a nominal anchor to fight with inflation. Mexico changed its’ regime 
several times between 1988 and 1994. Firstly a completely fixed exchange regime was 
adapted; it was followed by a soft peg regime with pre-announced devaluation rates 
based on ongoing inflation rates and lastly exchange rate band with a sliding ceiling. 
Mexico government aimed to discourage short-term capital inflow and to deal with 
exchange rate corrections if needed with the choice of exchange rate regime (Edwards, 
1997). Until NAFTA agreement in the beginning of 1994, peso/dollar rate was stable 
and exchange rate regime was supported by fiscal and monetary policies (Edwards, 
1997). 
With these reforms, Mexico reached averaged 3.1 % economic growth for 1989-
1994 period and single-digit level of inflation in 1993 (Gil-Diaz, 1998). Inflation was 
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8% in 1993 comparing to 160 % in 1988. In addition to these, overall public sector fiscal 
balance had a surplus of 1 % of GDP in 1993 comparing to the  deficit of 11 %  in 1988 
(Griffith-Jones, 1997). These positive processes attracted attention of international 
investors. Large capital inflow began with the expectation of Mexico to be one of the 
advanced economies with solid growth, stability and prosperity after being member of 
NAFTA (Edwards, 1997). Short-term characteristics stock market securities and Mexico 
government short- term bonds heavily attracted the international investors. Especially, 
they invested on “Tesobonos” dollar denominated short term papers, which were firstly 
issued in 1991. With these securities, Mexican government took exchange rate risk and 
attracted more capital. The stock of Tesobonos were higher than the international 
reserves in the mid of 1994, which increased Mexico’s fragility (Griffith-Jones, 1997). 
However these hey-days did not last long. In 1994 Mexico felt in a political 
turbulence. Mexico faced so many political problems in the beginning of the 1994 and 
before the elections, public expenditures increased heavily. These continuing political 
problems induced depletion of confidence in international area. In addition to these, US 
Federal Reserve’s repeated interest raise policy affected attractiveness of Mexico for 
capital investors negatively. Therefore, capital outflow began (Griffith-Jones, 1997). In 
addition to these Mexico had high levels of current account deficit (in 1994, 7 % of 
GDP), which began to seem as unsustainable. To live with high level of current account 
deficit, capital inflows were vital for Mexico. To attract the capital investors, Mexico 
government could increase the interest rates but this option was not chosen not to 
increase unemployment level and decrease growth level. Mexican government also was 
reluctant to choose this way because banks gave too many credits with low levels of 
interest by taking the risk of interest rate. In addition to this, Mexico did not choose the 
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other way, devaluation and it defended the currency from rapid capital outflow with 
sterilization. Although the first attack was managed, high levels of international reserves 
were lost. 
At the end of 1994, political problems, current account deficit and public debt, 
which were heavily short term and dollar denominated based peaked.  Level of 
international reserve was very low, nearly 6 billion dollar. In addition to these, Federal 
Reserve announced that they would not let Mexico use the swap opportunity. All these 
triggered capital outflow.  On December 20, 1994 new Mexican authorities enlarged the 
bands by % 15. This increased expectation of the devaluation and capital outflow 
accelerated. With very low levels of international reserves, Mexico could not defend the 
currency from speculative attack. Mexico let the peso float after two days facing with a 
severe balance of payment crisis. (Whitehead, 1997) 
 
4.2.2 Reasons Behind The 1994 Mexico Crisis 
In 1994, Mexico’s the brilliant appearance for future turned into economically 
collapsed country. It lost nearly all of its international reserves and faced a balance of 
payment crisis (Gil-Diaz, 1998). 
What were the reasons behind this crisis? Soft peg regime caused appreciation of 
the currency, which enlarged the current account deficit. In addition to this, exchange 
rate regime increased the possibility of speculative attack. On the other hand, despite 
numerous reforms were adapted in Mexico, Mexico had so many fragilities in 
macroeconomic area and banking sector. In addition to these, political uncertainties 
augmented the doubts. 
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To summarize, main reasons behind the 1994 crisis can be counted as, 
unsustainable current account deficit, which was funded by relatively short-term capital 
inflow, political turbulence and increased public debt especially before the election 
period, low level of international reserves to defend the currency, fragile banking system 
with mismatched balance sheets, credit boom which was expanded imprudently and 
devaluation decision after waiting long time.  In the following sub-sections, these 
situations are investigated in detail. 
a) External Appearance and Debt Management 
Mexico’s current account deficit increased rapidly and consistently and reached 
7.7 % of GDP in 1994 (Griffith-Jones, 1997). Although current account deficit gave the 
signals in the middle of stabilization program, the politicians did not give enough 
importance to it and did not take any caution. The liberalization process was too rapid in 
the end of 1980s that economic system could not adjust so many changes at the same 
time appropriately, which left a high current account deficit as a heritage (Griffith-Jones, 
1997). When table 7 shows, summary of balance of payment of Mexico is given for 
1990-1994 period; chart 1 exhibits the progress of current account deficit since 1985. As 
it can be observed from the chart and the table, Mexico’s current account deficit had a 
continuously increasing trend. 
Chart 1: Current Account Balance of Mexico between 1985 and 1994 
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1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Seri 1 0,4 -1,3 2,7 -1,4 -2,8 -3 -5,1 -7,4 -6,4 -7,7
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CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE OF MEXICO
 
Source: Griffith-Jones Stephany. (1997) "Causes and Lessons of Mexican  
Peso Crisis"The United Nations University Working Paper No:32 
Data : Banco de Mexico and IMF, International Financial Statistic 
 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Current account -989 -5,823 -7,45 -14,649 -24,439 -23,4 -28,786
Capital account -5,774 4,745 10,889 22,232 26,361 30,491 10,866
Official capital 265 -1,124 -1,82 3,424 7,94 7,882 -400
Medium- and long-term borrowing 1,459 -29 6,371 1,226 -3,821 1,601 1,447
Short term 219 -199 483 529 1,843 1,063 2,172
Non-resident purchases of Mexican Government bonos- - - 3,406 8,147 7,013 -1,942
Tesobonos - - - 253 -62 1,063 14,338
Other government financial assets -1,412 -896 -8,674 -1,736 1,772 -1,794 -2,076
Private capital -6,039 5,869 12,709 18,807 18,421 22,609 11,266
Direct investment 2,595 3,037 2,633 4,762 4,393 4,389 7,98
Equity investments - 493 1,995 6,332 4,783 10,717 4,088
Net international reserves (increase -) 6,763 1,078 -3,439 -7,583 -1,923 -7,092 17,919
Data from Banco de Mexico and IMF,International Financial Statistics
TABLE 7 : SUMMARY CAPITAL ACCOUNTS, 1988-94
In millions of US dollars
Source: Griffith-Jones Stephany. (1997) "Causes and Lessons of Mexican Peso Crisis"The United Nations 
University Working Paper No:32
 
Chart 2 shows Mexico’s deteriorated current account balance before 1994 crisis. 1994, 
crisis period is chosen as t. 
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CHART 2: Mexico’s Current Account (BIL. US$) 
 
Data: Banco de Mexico 
Current account was funded by the capital inflows. Until the end of 1993, net 
capital flows were higher than current account deficit so that foreign exchange reserves 
increased. However, this situation did not last long. With the political uncertainties and 
interest rate increases of Federal Reserve capital inflows began to decrease.  
On the other hand, the structure of the capital inflow was so unbalanced with 
high proportion of short-term capital inflow. As it can be observed in table 8, high 
proportion of the capital inflow was portfolio investment; even it reached 67 % of total 
inflows in 1990-1993. These kind of portfolios are known to be more prone to the 
reversal and more volatile (Griffith-Jones, 1997). First of all, with the liberalization of 
the Mexico Stock Markets in 1989, the ratio of foreigners heavily increased. Foreigners 
purchased 28 billion dollar Mexican equities during 1990-1993 comparing to the less 
than 1 billion dollar annually numbers before 1990 (Griffith-Jones, 1997).  Table 9 
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shows the ratio of non-residents holdings of public holdings. Ratio of foreign investors 
increased to nearly 70 %, although it was only 8 % in the beginning of 1991. 
67 21 12 100
COMPOSITION OF(%) MEXICAN CAPITAL INFLOWS,1990-1993
TABLE 8:
Source: Griffith-Jones Stephany. (1997) "Causes and Lessons of Mexican 
Peso Crisis"The United Nations University Working Paper No:32
Data from Banco de Mexico and IMF,International Financial Statistics
PORTFOLIO 
INVESTMENT
FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT
OTHER (inc. Bank 
lending)
TOTAL
 
 
CETES Ajustabonos Tesobonos Bondes Total
January 1991 7,30 7,4 58,9 8,4 8
December 1992 21,9 15,9 78,7 4 13,1
December 1993 75,8 41,4 58,6 12,4 45,6
December 1994 63,1 53,4 80,3 18,7 56,6
December 1994 60,2 19,1 79 5 69,3
Source: Griffith-Jones Stephany. (1997) "Causes and Lessons of Mexican Peso Crisis"The United 
Nations University Working Paper No:32
Data from Banco de Mexico and IMF,International Financial Statistics
Percentage of total public holdings
TABLE 9 : NON-RESIDENT INVESTMENTS IN MEXICAN GOVERNMENT 
SECURITIES,1991,1994
 
Secondly, the ratio of short-term government bonds hold by foreigners was high 
enough to constitute a risk over capital flow. In 1991 foreigners had 3.4 billion dollar 
government debt, and they purchased 18 billion dollar between 1991 and 1993. Between 
these years, foreigners were holding 57 % of the government securities (Griffith-Jones, 
1997). In addition to this, Mexico issued short-term, dollar indexed, peso–denominated 
government securities Tesobonos in 1991. These high ratios of the short-term dollar-
indexed government securities with their high volatile characteristics increased the 
possibility of capital outflows and also foreign exchange risk for the issuers stemmed 
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from exchange rate regime. When Griffith-Jones (1997) shows one of the reasons of the 
Mexico Crises as management of the public debt, Whitehead (1997) mentions that 
Mexico government heated up its problems by rolling over its debt with short-term 
securities and taking the foreign exchange risk. 
Another important reason of the current account deficit was the dissaving of the 
private sector (Griffith-Jones, 1997). Whitehead (1997) specifies that current account 
deficit reached 8 % of GDP because of the gap between domestic saving, investment and 
raising reliance on foreign savings. Whitehead (1997) explains the decrease on the 
domestic private saving with rapid increase in commercial bank credit and higher private 
domestic spending, high unemployment levels and relatively low growth levels. 
Domestic saving decreased to 11 % of GDP in 1994 from the 21 % of GDP numbers in 
1989. Credit expansion, which will be talked about in the following sub-sections and 
increased import ratios because of overvalued Peso contributed the current account 
deficit. 
When capital inflows began to decrease, Mexico Government perceived that 
situation as temporary and did not take any caution (Griffith-Jones, 1997).  In addition to 
this, Mexico government did not have high level of international reserves to defend the 
currency in a speculative attack.   This low level also triggered the investor to withdraw 
their investment with the depletion of the confidence. Mexico used high amount of 
international levels in the beginning of 1994, when the first suspicions emerged with the 
reversal of capital outflow. At the end of 1994, when the suspicions peaked, Mexico had 
less than 6 billion dollar international reserves. 
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b) Exchange rate mechanism and its consequences 
Mexico adapted an exchange rate based stabilization program in 1987. Until the 
crisis, exchange rate regime was changed from fixed to firstly crawling peg then 
adjustable peg and lastly enlargement of the bands just before the speculative attack. In 
this period, exchange rate regime was used as main nominal anchor to fight with the 
inflation. However, peso appreciated nearly 30 % between 1989 and 1994. Although 
Mexico government preferred fixed and soft peg regimes to decrease inflation to low 
levels quickly, government did not take any action to prevent   overvaluation of the 
currency (Griffith-Jones, 1997).  This overvaluation caused inflation to fall slowly than 
expected. As Whitehead (1997) mentions, Mexico had to choose one of the options, 
firstly let the peso fall or to increase the interest rates. Mexico never chose interest raise 
with the fear of weak banking system and possible devastating effect on unemployment 
and growth levels. On the other hand as Steward (1997) mentioned, exchange rate 
stabilization program was expected to eliminate the “inertia inflation”. Program 
diminished the “inertia inflation” but could not eliminate it.  
c) Financial Appearance 
Before the 1994 Mexico Peso crisis, the appearance of the Mexican financial 
system was not sound. In the 1990s with the fast liberalization process, banking sector 
was heavily privatized without taking regulatory or supervisory actions and new owners 
of the banks were not experienced of the banking system (Griffith-Jones, 1997). 
In the beginning of the 1990s, uncontrolled credit expansion was observed, 
which contributed the current account deficit in an important manner. Gil-Diaz (1997) 
shows the reason of this   dangerous credit expansion as; improved economic 
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expectations, important reduction in the public debt, extraordinary international attention 
for securitized debt, a strong private-investment response and an increase on the real 
estate and in the stock market. 
In 1993, nonperforming loans increased heavily as a return of rapid consumer 
credit. Gil-Diaz (1997) shows the main reasons of these nonperforming loans as;  
• After a rapid liberalization and privatization process, banking sector 
owners and workers were not experienced to screen borrowers and so many credits were 
given to consumers or firms who were not able to pay the credits back. 
• There was no strong banking supervision and regulative institutions on 
the banking system. In addition to this important deficiency, lending and borrowing rates 
were made free, reserve requirement ratios for the banks were eliminated and forced 
channeling of the credit was cancelled. All these triggered the moral hazard in the 
banking system and ratio of the unqualified credits increased. Although consumer credit 
increased rapidly and contributed the current account deficit in an important ratio, 
government did not take any action in financial sector to control it (Griffith-Jones, 
1997). 
On the other hand, banks took so many foreign exchange rate risks by borrowing 
in foreign exchange rate based and giving lend in foreign exchange rate based. In 
devaluation, borrowers may become insolvent and cannot pay credit back to the money. 
These would affect all the banking system like a domino stones. These possibilities were 
not taken into account; there was no caution for the banks’ mismatched balance sheets in 
Mexico (Griffith-Jones, 1997). A similar possibility; if there may be bank runs in any 
devaluation, with mismatched balance sheets the banks would go bankruptcy. Financial 
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sector and government authorities did not show any attention to this situation, although 
Mexican banks hold high amount of short term liabilities.  Nearly 70 % of Mexican 
banks’ liabilities were payable overnight and approximately all of the rest was very short 
term based. (Gil-Diaz,1998). 
 
4.3 1997 – 1998 The East Asian Crisis 
4.3.1 The Crisis Period 
Asian Countries showed incredible economic performance for decades until the 
end of the 1990s. ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand) countries’ annual GDP growth averages were approximately over % 8 for end 
of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. In addition to this growth rate, Asian countries 
increased their per capita income levels excessively since from 1960s. This level 
increased by ten times in Korea, five times in Thailand and four times in Malaysia. 
Even, Singapore and Hong Kong reached higher per capita income levels more than 
some developed countries (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998). 
Moreover, Asian countries attracted nearly half of the total capital inflows to the 
emerging countries before 1997. Total capital inflow to emerging countries shifted from 
$ 46 billion in 1990 to $ 236 billion in 1996.  South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and the Philippines attracted $93 billion in 1996, when they only attracted $47 
billion in 1994 (Wade, 1998). For the last decade before 1997 Asian countries’ share 
was one fifth of the total world export, which was doubled comparing the numbers of 10 
years before (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998). In addition to this, Asian countries were 
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important importer from the rest of the world, which stimulated the general world 
growth (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998). 
However, Asian countries outstanding performance halted with the 1997 East 
Asian Crisis. The crisis began in Thailand and spread over all Asian countries and nearly 
all the countries were affected by different ratios. Pressures on Thai Baht began in July, 
1996. The liquidity injections to financial sector by the Bank of Thailand after the 
collapse of the Bangkok Bank of Commerce were not enough to stop the doubt seeds of 
the international investors, when Thailand was also in a political instability. In 1997, 16 
finance companies’ operations were suspended, which escalated the suspicions over 
Thailand (Kaminskya and Schmuklerb, 2005). On July 2, 1997 Thailand faced with 
speculative attacks and had to float Thai baht after a sharp devaluation, which was 
pegged to a basket of currencies with USA dollar domination. This sharp devaluation in 
Thai baht attracted attention of the international players and other currencies were 
exposed to attacks (Wong et al., 2000). Philippines followed Thailand and it abandoned 
the peg and began to float its currency after a sharp decline in the currency, increases in 
interest rates and depletion of the reserves (Kaminskya and Schmuklerb, 2005). Shortly 
after, Malaysia changed its exchange rate regime from tightly managed float to other 
managed float after facing with attacks. When Malaysia was trying to defend the 
Ringgit, interest rates increased, reserves decreased. In the end, a sharp depreciation 
occurred. Similarly Indonesia abandoned backward looking crawling band regime in 
August, 1997 with a sharp depreciation and rises in interest rates. 
In October 1997, Taiwan was infected from the currency crisis with the 
devaluation of the Taiwanese dollar (Kaminskya and Schmuklerb, 2005).  On the other 
hand, other countries Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore were affected less from 
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the Asian crises compared to the aforementioned countries. When Hong Kong and South 
Korea did not change their exchange rate regimes, Singapore extended the bands after 
depreciation. However these countries had long recession period in the real sector with 
bankruptcies and defaults. Briefly, Asian countries faced with the crises under different 
exchange rate regimes- generally under hard peg and soft peg regimes- some of them 
changed their exchange rate regimes and many of them faced with banking crisis and the 
recession in the real sector stemmed from the financial distress. 
4.3.2 Reasons Behind The Crisis 
In 1997 so many East Asian countries faced contagion effect of the Thailand 
currency crisis. Many of them had to abandon their soft or hard peg regimes. Although 
some suffered from speculative attack, all of them lived the recession and sudden capital 
outflow. What went wrong? How did the investors lose their confidence? 
In the literature, there is a consensus about this twin crisis. The countries faced 
with currency crisis and financial crisis after they were exposed to speculative attacks. 
According to Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini’s (1998) view, Asian countries were 
excessively vulnerable to financial crises sourced from both cumulative effects of the 
real and financial imbalances. These imbalances were supported by political instabilities 
with structural and policy distortions. All the imbalances and distortions caused 
elimination of the investors’ confidence and speculative attack began. When Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (1998) show the main reasons of the East Asian Crisis as, over-lending 
which was exacerbated by implicit and explicit deposit guarantees, poor supervision and 
moral-hazard problem in banking sector, they also do not ignore the role of 
overvaluation of the currency, weakened export ratios and the bursting of asset price 
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bubbles. When Krugman and Obstfeld (1994) accept the same reasons like previously 
mentioned authors as lack of strong regulative and supervision framework in the 
banking sector, unsound credit mechanism, excessively lending with moral hazard, poor 
quality investment with the support of the governments, they also add inadequate 
productivity levels, lack of corporate governance and lack of strong legal framework of 
the companies. Stanley Fischer (1998) from IMF mentions similar reasons; large 
external deficit and property and stock market bubbles, excessively un-hedged external 
borrowing and financial and corporate sector’s being so vulnerable to foreign exchange 
risk sourced from maintaining exchange rate regimes too long, lack of prudential rules 
and regulations on banking system, political uncertainties and suspicions over the 
authorities to commit and have ability to implement the required adjustments for 
pressures on stock market and currencies. He also adds that governments’ reluctance to 
adapt tight monetary policies and close the insolvent financial institutions triggered the 
crisis. Wade (1998) like his colleagues counts the reasons with same frames: deep 
domestic debt, fixed peg regimes that provide the perception of little risk for borrowing,  
early liberalization of capital markets in the 1990s before constructing a strong 
regulatory structure and vast flow of excess liquidity of Japan and Europe which created 
deep foreign debt.  
As a summary, it can be observed that the effect of the exchange rate regime on 
the crisis is not ignorable. Hard and soft peg regimes caused the increase on liability 
dollarization by providing riskless appearance and overvaluations in currencies caused 
loss of competitiveness and deterioration in export levels (IMF Staff, 1998). 
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On the other hand, the weaknesses in financial structures and debt structures 
supported with political turbulences had higher responsibility of the crisis. In the 
following sub-sections, these aforementioned reasons will be discussed in detail.  
 
a) External Balances 
High proportion of the East Asian countries adapted soft peg regimes and hard 
peg regimes. The reason behind adaptation of these kinds of exchange rate regimes was 
not to fight with inflation like Latin America countries or Turkey. However these 
countries generally adapted pegged regimes against USA dollar, to facilitate external 
financing of the domestic projects (Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1998). A credible peg 
would provide decrease on currency risk premium charged by international investors, 
consequently there would be reductions of the cost of borrowing. 
Where Malaysia, Thailand and Philippines adapted rigid exchange rate regimes 
pegged to USA dollar, Korea followed more flexible exchange rate policy (Corsetti, 
Pesenti and Roubini,1998). On the other hand, policy of Indonesia and Taiwan can be 
described as policy of exchange rate targeting. 
Generally, exchange rate appreciation deteriorates the countries’ 
competitiveness, trade balance consequently current account balance. The important part 
of loss of competitiveness because of the currency appreciation in the East Asian 
countries sourced from the changes in USA dollar, especially after the mid of 1995 
(Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini,1998). The table 10 shows the real exchange rate for the 
East Asian Countries. As it can be observed from the table, between 1990 and 1997 
except Korea nearly all the countries experienced real appreciation (Corsetti, Pesenti and 
Roubini, 1998).  
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Table 10 Real Exchange Rate. End of year data.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Korea 96,00 91,50 87,70 85,20 84,70 87,70 87,20 58,60
Indonesia 97,40 99,60 100,80 103,80 101,00 100,50 105,40 62,40
Malaysia 97,00 96,90 109,70 111,00 107,10 106,90 112,10 84,90
Philippines 92,40 103,10 107,10 97,40 111,70 109,60 116,40 90,90
Singapore 101,20 105,70 106,00 108,60 111,90 112,70 118,20 114,40
Thailand 102,20 99,00 99,70 101,90 98,30 101,70 107,60 72,40
Hong Kong 99,70 103,90 108,50 116,00 114,50 116,00 125,80 138,40
Taiwan 96,50 95,70 95,70 91,40 92,60 90,40 89,60 89,20
Data Source: J.P. Morgan. The base figure (100) is the average for the year 1990.
Source: Corsetti, Giancarlo , Paolo Pesenti and Nouriel Roubini (1998) "What Caused the Asian 
Currency and Financial Crisis? Part1 : A Macroeconomic Overview" National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge
 
 
In addition to real appreciation, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) explain the 
reason of misalignment as long lasted stagnation in Japan affected worse its East Asian 
Trading partners with slowdown in the export levels and increasing weight of China in 
export levels. 
These countries trade balance were deteriorated or slowed down before the crisis.  
Table 11 shows trade balance of the East Asian countries between 1990 and 1997. 
Except Singapore and Taiwan, all countries faced trade balance deterioration in different 
ratios. 
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Korea -0,81 -3,04 -1,42 0,06 -1,22 -1,63 -4,36 -1,44
Indonesia 1,68 0,91 1,81 1,48 0,72 -0,76 -1,14 0,22
Malaysia 2,10 -3,74 1,39 -0,11 -1,59 -3,75 0,58
Philippines -5,73 -3,00 -4,27 -8,53 -8,95 -8,80 -9,44 -12,30
Singapore 6,76 10,62 9,29 8,12 14,87 15,38 13,62 12,55
Thailand -7,75 -6,88 -4,70 -4,56 -5,18 -7,09 -6,65 0,14
Taiwan 4,74 4,39 1,69 1,60 1,66 1,61 3,45 2,35
Source: Corsetti, Giancarlo , Paolo Pesenti and Nouriel Roubini (1998) "What Caused the Asian 
Currency and Financial Crisis? Part1 : A Macroeconomic Overview" National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge
Table 11 Trade Balance, BOP Definition (% of GDP)
 
b) Political Uncertainties 
The political uncertainties in political area peaked in 1997 in numerous East 
Asian countries, which was one of the main reasons of the international investors’ 
confidence depletion. Political turbulence in Thailand, Malaysia, election period’s 
uncertainty in Indonesia and Korea effected the market reactions (Corsetti, Pesenti and 
Roubini, 1998). Political uncertainty played an important role in the crisis period by 
decreasing the international investor’s confidence.  
c) Debt Management 
Countries debt structures play important role for triggering currency crises. If the 
debt structure does not give confidence to the investors and seems unsustainable, 
investors do not want keep their hot money in that country. There is a high probability to 
live a short-run liquidity problem with the panic of investors, if the international reserves 
are not adequate to finance short-term debt. With capital outflows, country may become 
unable to roll-over its short-term and become insolvent (Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 
1998). 
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Table 12 shows short term debt numbers as a ratio of foreign reserves for the 
East Asian countries. Especially Korea and Indonesia show unpleasant appearance with 
short-term debts over its reserves. Philippines and Thailand has high ratio of short-term 
debts, whereas Malaysia has an increasing ratio. Only Singapore shows good appearance 
of debt structure. 
Table 12 Short-Term Debt, World Bank Data (% of foreign reserves).
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Korea 72,13 81,75 69,62 60,31 54,06 171,45 203,23
Indonesia 149,28 154,62 172,81 159,70 160,36 189,42 176,59
Malaysia 19,54 19,05 21,12 25,51 24,34 30,60 40,98
Philippines 479,11 152,31 119,37 107,68 95,00 82,85 79,45
Singapore 2,65 2,67 2,35 2,04 1,75 1,78 2,60
Thailand 62,55 71,31 72,34 92,49 99,48 114,21 99,69
Hong Kong 23,52 21,78 18,38 17,09 16,49 14,16 22,35
Taiwan 21,56 20,21 21,00 23,64 21,76 21,64 21,31
Source: Corsetti, Giancarlo , Paolo Pesenti and Nouriel Roubini (1998) "What Caused 
the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis? Part1 : A Macroeconomic Overview" National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge
 
 Table 13 shows the total short term debt of the East Asian Countries. Except Taiwan, 
all the countries have an increasing trend in short-term debts. Although ratios of short 
term debts do not have miserable appearance, their ratios to foreign reserves are in 
dangerous boundaries.  
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Korea 30,87 28,19 26,99 25,85 25,47 51,60 50,20
Indonesia 15,92 18,00 20,52 20,17 18,05 20,87 24,98
Malaysia 12,43 12,14 18,18 26,58 21,13 21,19 27,83
Philippines 14,48 15,24 15,93 14,01 14,29 13,38 19,34
Singapore 17,51 18,92 19,91 17,87 13,28 14,56 19,81
Thailand 29,63 33,13 35,22 53,01 60,67 72,36 41,41
Hong Kong 45,97 46,63 45,89 41,19 30,04 28,36 43,57
Taiwan 88,31 86,49 86,93 84,99 76,75 72,18 68,44
Table 13: Short-Term Debt, World Bank Data (% of Total).
Source: Corsetti, Giancarlo , Paolo Pesenti and Nouriel Roubini (1998) "What Caused 
the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis? Part1 : A Macroeconomic Overview" National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge  
d) Financial Weaknesses 
In the literature, there is a long list about the weaknesses in financial sector 
which is shown as tne main responsible of the 1997 East Asian crises (Corsetti, Pesenti 
and Roubini, 1998). These are lack of strong supervision and regulation capacity, low 
capital adequacy ratios, low quality in project selection and monitoring, mismatched 
balance sheet structures of banking sector, excessively foreign debt structure of the 
companies, lack of corporate governance apprehension, lack of  financial experience of 
the managers in the banks and companies. 
 Banking sector were heavily exposed to high degrees of moral hazard. Although 
the banks were not regulated, their liabilities were perceived to have implicit 
government guarantee, which triggered risky lending excessively with moral hazard 
(Krugman, 1998). This caused to inflation in asset prices. As the assets were overpriced, 
the demand for the assets increased and risky lending. The prices of assets increased 
more, and this situation began to show the banks more strong. However, one day this 
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bubble burst and with the fall of the asset prices, the banks appearance turned in to 
insolvent (Krugman, 1998). 
Like these asymmetric information problems in which one party of a financial 
contract is not as informed as the other party, financial intermediaries cannot channel 
funds efficiently to the most productive investment opportunities and there would be 
deterioration on their balance sheet especially with the increase of non-performing loans 
(Mishkin, 1998).  In the East Asian banking sector, this kind of inefficiency was 
enormous stemmed from mainly two reasons.  Firstly, excessively lending ratio was too 
high because the administrations of the banks were not experienced and effective to 
value the risk appropriately when lending. In addition to these, the banks were not 
effective to monitor these projects because they did not accumulate necessary 
managerial capital like well-trained managers or risk-evaluating systems (Mishkin, 
1998). Secondly, there was not strong regulatory framework to monitor the bank’s 
activities or restrict them in order to prevent the moral hazard.  Despite the lack of 
regulatory framework, depositors and foreign lenders did not need the monitor the banks 
because they believed to be bailed-out by the governments (Mishkin, 1998). 
On the other hand, capital inflow increased the level of excessive lending. 
Foreign capital flows into the banks were not managed well and banks took so many 
risky actions. 
With the burst of asset bubble and increase on non-performing loans, the balance 
sheet of the banks deteriorated. The mismatching problems appeared obviously. Table 
14 shows the non-performing loan ratio, which is considerably high enough in Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand. 
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Korea 8
Indonesia 13
Malaysia 10
Philippines 14
Singapore 4
Thailand 13
Hong Kong 3
Taiwan 4
Data Source: 1997 BIS Annual Report; Jardine Fleming.
Table 14 : Non-Performing Loans (as proportion of 
total lending in 1996)
Source: Corsetti, Giancarlo , Paolo Pesenti and 
Nouriel Roubini (1998) "What Caused the Asian 
Currency and Financial Crisis? Part1 : A 
Macroeconomic Overview" National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge
 
 
In addition to weaknesses in the financial sector, the companies did not have 
corporate governance apprehension and they took so many foreign- exchange risk, 
which escalated the possibility of non-performing loans.  
Following charts show net foreign liabilities (Foreign liabilities-foreign assets) 
structure of the banking sector for Korea, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Singapore in US $ 
billion.  T (time) shows the crisis period. In all the countries, banking sectors’ net 
liabilities increased, which makes banking sector very sensitive any changes in the 
currency. 
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CHART 3 : Net Liabilities of Banking Sector in Korea (US $ billion) 
 
 
Source: Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS): International Banking  
and Financial Market Developments 
 
CHART 4 : Net Liabilities of Banking Sector in Indonesia (US $ billion) 
 
Source: Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS): International Banking  
and Financial Market Developments 
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CHART 5 : Net Liabilities of Banking Sector in Hong Kong (US $ billion) 
 
Source: Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS): International Banking and 
Financial Market Developments 
 
CHART 6 : Net Liabilities of Banking Sector in Singapore (US $ billion) 
 
Source: Source: Bank of International Settlements (BIS): International Banking  
and Financial Market Developments 
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The financial system had so many structural weaknesses so that it is showed as 
the main reason of the East Asian, and this crisis is categorized as a financial crisis. 
4.4 1999 The Brazil Crisis 
4.4.1 The Crisis Period 
Like its neighbor Mexico, Brazil faced a balance of payment crisis under 
adaptation of crawling peg regime in1999. The history was similar, inherent high 
inflation rates for decades, adaptation of exchange rate based stabilization program and a 
severe crisis with the depletion of the international reserves after speculative attacks. 
Brazil shared the same faith with other Latin America Countries. Approximately, 
during a decade Brazil had inflation rates ranging from 100 %  to 3000 % per year 
(Evangelist and Sathe, 2004). In the 1990s Brazil government took so many actions to 
reduce inflation and control public spending (Evangelist and Sathe, 2004). In 1994 
Brazil reissued the Real and adapted the new plan called The Real. The Real plan was 
compromising three stages. First one was a brief fiscal adjustment, which was 
constituted of cutting spending and creation of the Emergency Social Fund. Second one 
was temporary monetary reform measure associated with linked contracts, prices and 
wages. And the last one was choice of exchange rate (crawling peg) as a nominal anchor 
(Evangelist and Sathe, 2004). With the choice of crawling peg regime, which was based 
on the dollar, interest rates were held higher in order to prevent inflationary pressures 
and attract international capitals (Evangelist and Sathe, 2004). 
The plan was successful to reduce and control the inflation. Inflation ratio 
decreased until two digit numbers in 1995 from four digit numbers and even it fell to 
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less than 2 %   in 1998 (Cardoso and Helwege, 1999). In the same period, interest rates 
were high enough to attract high amount of capital flow. Average of the real interest 
rates between 1995 and 1998 was 22 % per year.  Not only unprecedented hot money 
flew into country, but also increase on the foreign direct investment was charming. FDI 
increased by 140 % in 1997 comparing with the previous year (Evangelist and Sathe, 
2004).  In addition to these, Brazil economy grew approximately more than % 3 per 
year. 
Despite the improvements in the inflation rates, capital flows and growth rates, 
Brazil government could not prevent fiscal deficit and current account deficit. Net public 
debt to GDP ratio increased to 44 % in 1998, although it was only 28 % in 1995. Even 
this ratio exceeded 50 % after 1999 devaluation (Cardoso and Helwege, 1999). When 
the fiscal deficit was 8 % in 1998, the current account deficit was 4.5 % of GDP at the 
same time. Political worries, elections periods and regulation on the wages augmented 
the fiscal deficit. Increase on the wages and public spending accelerated the 
consumption ratio, the import levels and consequently current account deficit. The 
highest appreciation on the Real occurred in 1994 with the Mexico crisis, and despite 
some minor devaluations in 1995 and 1998, the level of the overvalued currency did no 
change too much (Cardoso and Helwege, 1999). Import ratio increased to $ 61 billion in 
1997 from $33 billion in 1994. With this climb, trade balance turned to a deficit of $ 8.4 
billion although it was $10 billion surplus (Cardoso and Helwege, 1999). These deficits 
and the structure of the public debt induced government finance to be very sensitive to 
changes in the short-term interest rate and currency. (IMF Publications, 1999). In 
addition to these, with this highly sensitive appearance, the political turbulences and 
recent crises in the emerging market countries attracted the international investor 
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attention on Brazil (IMF Publications, 1999). The first crisis exploded in Mexico, which 
triggered the doubts of the international investors over all emerging markets. In the end 
of 1994 and in the beginning of 1995 with the reactions of these doubts, capital inflow to 
Brazil was not high enough to finance current account deficit.  Brazil central bank lost $ 
9.8 billion in that period.  Although Mexico crisis depleted investors’ confidence, the 
IMF and USA support reforms for Mexico calmed the investors down. However after 
only two years, The Asian Crisis exacerbated the panics. 
In 1997, Brazil government took several measures to provide confidence in the 
international markets. It announced tight monetary policy, cutting on spending, tax 
increases, and a strong fiscal policy. However so many deficiencies on the adaptation of 
these measures again depleted the investors’ confidence. With the contagion effect of the 
1998 Russian crisis, doubts reached the peak. Interest rate increases were ineffective to 
prevent capital outflow. However the following rescue pocket of the IMF restrained the 
capital outflow for a short period. In December 1998, with the political problems in the 
Brazil Congress, capital outflow increased and on the 13 January of 1995, Brazil had to 
enlarge exchange rate band. This enlargement was also ineffective and Brazilian Central 
Bank lost $ 30 billion to defend the real and with the depletion of international reserves, 
the real was let to float on 15th of January (Cardoso and Helwege, 1999).  
4.4.2 Reasons Behind The Crisis 
Brazil adapted crawling peg regime in order to decrease hyper inflation rates. In 
the beginning of the program, incredible success was attained. On the other hand, Brazil 
did not apply properly other components of the Real Plan and could not control the 
speed of the fiscal deficit. 
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Some authors criticize Brazil to wait too long to exit from the exchange rate 
based stabilization program after reaching low levels of inflation, which was targeted. 
Exit strategies have always been any other important question of the academics and 
countries usually are criticized to wait too long or to wait until irrevocable speculative 
attacks usually because of political reasons. 
Brazil faced overvaluation in the Real like so many country faced under 
adaptation of soft peg regimes. This situation triggered the current account deficit. 
However, this overvaluation and current account deficit was not the only reason of the 
speculative attack. Public spending increased fast, which deteriorated fiscal deficit.  Fast 
increase on the spending contributed the current account deficit. This contribution was 
one of the main responsible of the current account deficit. On the other hand, Brazil can 
be called unlucky for timing and situation as it affected highly from the global 
confidence depletion of the international investors. The Mexico crisis’ still continuing 
effect, The Asian Crisis and The Russian Crisis triggered the speculative attacks to 
Brazil. 
Although Brazil had more strong financial appearance with stronger banking 
system without any weak credit boom comparing to Mexico, Brazil did not show strong 
appearance of monetary and fiscal positions. Like Mexico, financing current account 
with capital inflow, which were usually short-term based made Brazil very sensitive to 
capital outflows. In the following sub-sections Brazil current account deficit and its 
reasons, fiscal deficit and exchange rate mechanism will be investigated in detail. In a 
summary, in Brazil crawling peg regime was used as a very effective tool to fight with 
the inflation. However, the bad progress on the public debt, current account deficit, 
political uncertainties and contagion effect of the other emerging countries’ currency 
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crisis induced a speculative attack on Brazil. Behind these reasons, overvaluation of the 
currency seems as a small naughty brother. 
a) Monetary Policy Appearance 
In March 1995, Brazil Central Bank adapted a crawling peg regime as a nominal 
anchor. There was no preannounced depreciations. Brazil Central Bank choose to not to 
announce the depreciation in order to provide more flexibility in fighting with inflation 
(De Paula and Hose Alves, 1999). With this nominal anchor, Brazil said goodbye to 
hyper inflation rates and had low inflation levels. According to Cardoso and Helwege, 
currency appreciation in this period associated with the low levels of inflation.  The 
effect of overvaluation was deterioration on the current account balance which will be 
examined in detail in the following sub-sections. To defend the overvalued currency and 
attract foreign capital Brazil increased interest rates, which caused increase on 
unemployment levels, interest burden on public debts (Ferreia and Tulio, 2002) 
b) External Appearance 
In the beginning of 1990s, like the other Latin America Countries, Brazil opened 
its trade. In this process, tariffs were eliminated, subsidies were cancelled so many 
incentives were given to the exporters (Cardoso and Helwege, 1999) 
On the other hand, interest rates were held higher to attract capital investors in 
the Real plan with the adaptation of the crawling peg regime. Interest rates were high 
enough to provide satisfactory arbitrage profit with short term capital inflow. However 
the high level of the capital inflow induced appreciation of the currency. Under the 
adaptation of the soft peg regime, overvalued currency caused harmful effects on the 
current account (Cardoso and Helwege, 1999). Overvalued currency triggered 
importation and as the currency appreciated, Brazil began to lose its competiveness. 
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From 1994 to 1999, the increase on the price index for traded goods was 27 % where the 
increase on non-traded goods was 120 %. These numbers prove the loss in 
competiveness (De Paula and Hose Alves, 1999). Consequently, trade deficit occurred 
and began to increase.  Between 1994 and 1997, import ratio climbed from $33 billion to 
nearly its double amount $61 billion. Chart 7 shows The Brazil trade balance between 
1990 and 1998 in US $ billions and Chart 8 shows current account balance for the same 
period. In chart 8, t is chosen as crisis period. As two chart shows, trade balance and 
current account balance were deteriorated continually. 
 
CHART 7: The Brazil Trade Balance Between 1990 and 1998 (US $ Billion) 
 
Data: Conjuctura Economica,various issues 
Source: Ferreira, Afanso and GuisseppeTullio (2002), "The Brazilian Exchange  
Rate Crisis of January 1999" Cambridge University Press 
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CHART 8: The Brazil Current Account Balance  (US $ million) 
 
Data: Banco Central Do Brasil 
On the other hand, this growing current account deficit was financed by capital 
inflow, which made Brazil very sensitive any change in the capital flow. Capital inflows 
were more than the need for current account finance so that the ratio of reserves 
increased (De Paula and Hose Alves, 1999). However in 1998 and 1999 Brazil lost 
nearly half of its international reserves to defend the currency. Chart 9 shows the trend 
of the international reserves. In the beginning of the program, high amount of 
international reserves were accumulated even it was doubled. However only in 6 
months, Brazil lost $35 billion dollar.  
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CHART 9: The Brazil International Reserves (US $ Billion) 
 
Data: Conjuctura Economica,various issues 
Source:Ferreira, Afanso and GuisseppeTullio (2002), "The Brazilian Exchange  
Rate Crisis of January 1999" Cambridge University Press 
 
Foreign capital was not only short term but also there was FDI to Brazil.  
However FDI ratio was not evident, because the increase on FDI partly depended on 
privatization of public enterprises and mergers and acquisitions in the private sector 
(Cardoso and Helwege, 1999) 
To provide continuity in the capital inflow required high interest rates. However 
high interest rates, and sterilization of the inflow induced increasing public internal debt, 
which deteriorated fiscal balance (Cardoso and Helwege, 1999) 
On the other hand, government’s several adjustments on the wages and salaries, 
fostered domestic consumption and import levels, which also contributed the current 
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account deficit. This contribution was associated with the difference between the 
domestic demand and domestic production (Ferreia and Tulio, 2002). 
In addition to aforementioned loss in competitiveness, Brazil could not be called 
as high productive country. Cardoso and Helwege  indicate that “large and growing 
current account deficit would only be sustainable if equivalent levels of long-term 
external funding available associated with productive investment capable of generating 
a future flow of exchange revenues to sufficient to pay off outstanding debt”. Brazil 
faced this deficiency. Neither it attracted enough long term capital, nor its’ productivity 
was high enough to generate future revenues.  
c) Fiscal appearance 
Like current account deficit, fiscal deficit had a growing trend. Especially in the 
election periods expansionary actions in the fiscal policy augmented public debts (De 
Paula and Hose Alves, 1999). Fiscal policy was not also consistent with the monetary 
policy, which was based on exchange rate policy and high interest rates. As  Ferria and 
Tulio specify, fiscal policy was one of the main factor behind the economic 
disequilibria. Government expenditures and triggered demand sourced from overvalued 
currency and adjustment in wages fostered consumption ratio and decreased saving 
ratios. Consumption share in GDP grew from 79.3 % in 1992 to 82.8 % in 1997 whereas 
the share of investment only grew 0.6 % in the same period (Ferreia and Tulio, 2002). 
Table 15 shows Brazil Fiscal deficit ratios, public sector requirement and interest 
payment ratios. The increase on the operational deficit is observed, whereas public 
sector requirement were decreasing. Interest burden on the public debt increased in that 
period significantly. 
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December 1990 29,6 -1,3 3,3
December 1991 23,3 -1,35 1,5
December 1992 43,1 2,16 4,42
December 1993 59,05 -0,25 2,42
December 1994 45,5 -1,37 3,92
December 1995 7,18 4,88 5,24
December 1996 5,87 3,75 3,66
December 1997 5,03 3,2 3,37
December 1998 8,03 7,54 7,51
Data: Conjuctura Economica,various issues
 Table 15 : Brazil Fiscal Deficit (all levels of govenment) -1990-1998-% Of 
GDP,
Year
Source:Ferreira, Afanso and GuisseppeTullio (2002), "The Brazilian 
Exchange Rate Crisis of January 1999" Cambridge University Press
Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement
Operational 
Deficit
Interest 
Payment
 
 
When the total debt structure is investigated, it can be seen as total foreign debt 
increased by $ 75 billion from 1995 to 1998 (Ferreia and Tulio, 2002). Government 
expenditures increased by 31 % in the same period (Ferreia and Tulio, 2002). GDP grew 
only 10.7 % in this period. Because of the high interest rates interest burden on public 
debt increased by 108 % (Ferreia and Tulio, 2002).  In fact Brazil’s public sector debt 
was not very high comparing to the international levels in 1999. However international 
investors’ concern depended on this continuously increasing trend more than the 
international average and public debt seemed to be unsustainable in the international 
area and flamed the speculative attack (Ferreia and Tulio, 2002). Table 16 shows Brazil 
Public Sector net debt for 1994 and 1998 period.  
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Period Total Internal External
December 1994 28,5 20,3 8,2
December 1995 29,9 24,5 5,4
December 1996 33,3 29,4 3,9
December 1997 43,9 31,1 12,8
December 1998 42,4 36,1 6,3
Data: Boletim da Macrometrica
Table 16 : Brazil Public Sector Net Debt -1994/1998 
% of GDP
Source:Ferreira, Afanso and GuisseppeTullio 
(2002), "The Brazilian Exchange Rate Crisis of 
January 1999" Cambridge University Press
  
 
4.5 2001 Turkey Crisis and Its Reasons 
4.5.1 The Crisis Period
 
Turkey had a long history with the high inflation levels. In addition to this, high 
public deficit rates and fluctuating growth rates were other important problems of 
Turkey. Real interest rates increased after the 1994 Turkey Crisis and in 1997-98 the 
effects of the East Asia and the Russian Crisis caused instability of Turkey’s economic 
balances. Consequently, the ratio of public deficit increased more and Turkey began to 
face difficulties in payment of debt and interests. According to the stand-by agreement, 
which was signed in 1995, Turkey adopted a managed floating regime. The Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) could intervene in the Foreign Exchange 
Market to minimize the fluctuations of exchange rate. Exchange rates were used as 
nominal anchor to fight with the high inflation rates and they were arranged parallel to 
the monthly inflation rates projected in the agreement (Görmez and Yilmaz, 2007). 
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However, Turkey needed any other program to alleviate these macroeconomic 
imbalances and provide consistent growth rates. 
In the beginning of 2000, Turkey implemented another stabilization program 
with the support of IMF. This new ambitious Exchange Rate Based Stabilization 
Program (ERBS) mainly aimed to reduce inflation, which was lying between 65-90% 
since the beginning of the 1990s (0zkan, 2005). Beside strong exchange rate 
commitment, this program required tight monetary control, large fiscal adjustment and a 
set of structural changes to liberalize the economy (0zkan, 2005). This program was 
planned to last for three years and its essential targets were: 
• To decrease Consumer Price Index (CPI) consistent with fiscal and monetary 
policies to  25% at the end of 2000, 12% at the end of 2001 and 7% at the end of 
2002. 
• To decrease the real interest rates. 
• 
 To enlarge the growth potential of the economy. 
• To allocate the resources of economy effectively and efficiently. 
The target and real values of Turkish Economy in 2000 and 2001 are given in the table 
17.  
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1999
target performance target * performance
-6,1 5 to 5.5 6,1 -3,0 ( 5 to 6) -9,4
62,9 20,0 32,7 57,6 (10 to 12) 88,6
68,8 25,0 39,0 52,5 (10 to 12) 68,5
106,2 - 38,0 81,1 100,4
25,2 - -11,4 23,7 -
32,0 - -6,5 36,4 -
-2,0 2,2 2,8 5,5 (5.0) 5,5
22,1 17,2 21,9 22,6 25,0
24,2 15,0 19,1 17,1 19,5
-12,4 -7,4 -6,6 -3,2 -
61,0 58,0 58,4 78,5 (56,5) 93,5
40,9 - 38,8 44,3 53,9
-0,7 -1.5 to -2,0 -4,8 -0,6 (-1.5 to -2,0) 1,5
34,0 ‹34,0 37,0 44,3 51,8
Source:  Akyüz, Yılmaz and Korkut Boratav (2003). The Making of the Turkish Financial Crisis.
www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/boratav.pdf
MACROECONOMIC TARGETS and PERFORMANCE OF TURKEY IN 2000&2001
Table 1 7: 
The authors formed the table from IMF Press Release No. 01/23, 15 May 2001 and CBRT (real sector performance 
figures for 2001)
Net debt
Net domestic debt
Current account balance
Net external debt
2000
Real (backward looking)
Real (forward looking)
Consolidated public sector***
External sector***
GNP growth rate
Primary balance
Net interest payment
PSBR (inc. CBRT profits)
Operational Balance
Real Sector
Average T-bill interest rate
2001
Nominal
WPI inflation**
CPI inflation**
*** In percent of Gross National Product
* Figures in brackets  give the targets set in the original stabilization program of December 1999
**12-month, end-of-period
 
 
In this program, crawling peg was adopted with the basket of the dollar and the 
euro. The exchange rates were announced daily and based on the inflation target, which 
was used as a nominal anchor. This program was planned to be executed until December 
of 2002. In this period three times of widening the band were decided at around a central 
exchange rate path. The band was planned to be extended to 7.5 % until the December 
2000, 15% until the June 2001 and 22.5% until the December 2002. In the beginning of 
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2003, freely floating exchange rate regime would have been adopted. This pre-
announced exit strategy was held to avoid from the problems of Latin America 
Countries’ previous exchange-rate-based stabilization programs. These programs were 
criticized of not paying enough attention to the real appreciation of currency without 
determination of any clear exit strategy. As the exit from the peg delays, currency 
misalignment and external imbalances would escalate (Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). 
However, the pre-announced exit strategy in Turkey’s stabilization program did not 
prevent undesired consequences. Inability to reach targeted inflation ratios augmented 
devaluation expectations at the exit time and induced earlier attack on the currency 
(Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). 
Another aspect of the program was “quasi-currency board”, in which central 
bank could not print money against domestic assets. With the allowance of some 
flexibility, upper ceiling for each quarter was set to the stock of net domestic assets. This 
level was equal to the CBRT’s net domestic asset at the end of the December 1999 
(Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). Under the scope of CBRT’s analytical balance sheet: 
Monetary base= Net Domestic Assets + Net Foreign Assets 
This means, the monetary base could only increase with the increase of the Net 
Foreign Assets come with capital flows. Since CBRT could not sterilize, the only tool 
for macroeconomic equilibrium was interest rate. When capital inflow was not enough 
to cover current-account deficit, interest rate would increase with the withdrawn of 
liquidity. Increased interest rates would attract capital and decrease import and provide 
external balance (Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). 
The fiscal adjustments including additional taxation, cuts in the public spending 
and funds from pension reform were aiming to reach a surplus in 2000 and improvement 
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in the primary balance of the consolidated public sector budget (Akyüz and Boratav, 
2002). 
The other structural reforms were arrangements on civil servants’ salaries 
according to the inflation target and if necessary correction related to the real inflation 
rates, privatization of state-owned enterprises, strengthening the banking system, 
improvements in agricultural policies and  the pension system (Akyüz and Boratav, 
2002). 
Although net domestic asset target and primary budget deficit target were 
reached during 2000, inflation rates were over the target level, which caused significant 
appreciation in real exchange rates. Inconsistent wage increases in public and private 
sector with the program stemmed from collective union agreements or payment methods 
based on the backward indexation respectively and burden of state owned enterprises’ 
losses on fiscal policies with requirement of price increases contributed to the rigidity of 
inflation (Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). 
On the other hand, interest rates performed better at the same period. The 
average of first ten months of 2000 for annualized interest rates for three month treasury 
bills declined to 38 % from the ratios over than 100 %. This significant decline in 
interest rates alleviated the burden of interest payments and improved the budget (Akyüz 
and Boratav, 2002). There was a balance between capital inflows and interest rates. 
Although the program did not permit for sterilization, capital inflows helped to decrease 
the interest rates. On the other side of this relation, interest rates were high enough to 
attract capital (Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). Since capital inflows were more than to cover 
current account deficit, CBRT accumulated international reserves. However, capital 
inflows without sterilization and lower interest rates led to increase of domestic 
  
100
liquidity, which strengthened the resistance of inflation (Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). 
Table 18 shows the progress of capital flows in this period. In the period between 
November 2000 and September 2001, high amount of capital outflow can be observed. 
Net capital inflows
Total net capital flows
Changes in reserves*
Errors and omissions
Current account balance
Source:  Akyüz, Yılmaz and Korkut Boratav (2003). The Making of the Turkish Financial Crisis.
www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/boratav.pdf
The authors formed the table from  CBRT  data
* Includes IMF credits and changes in official reserves. Minus sign indicates increase.
 Table 18: BOOM AND BUST IN CAPITAL FLOWS IN THE TURKISH CRISIS
(Millions of dollars)
-2.550 
-7.598 
-12.416 
-13.663 
16.585
-3.215 
293
January-October 2000 November 2000-September 2001
15.179
12.474
-2.324 
 
In the first period of the program, non-residents trusted IMF support that 
motivated them to lend and invest heavily in Turkey. Although depreciation of Lira was 
much lower than the pre-announced depreciation rates, residents were reluctant to have 
Turkish Lira deposit. Residents’ attitude towards the foreign currencies caused increase 
on the foreign exchange rate deposit and decrease on Turkish Lira deposit. On the other 
hand, banks took so many currency risks by mismatching the asset and the liability side 
of their balance sheet and heavily borrowing foreign exchange currency based (Akyüz 
and Boratav, 2002).  
Real appreciation of the currency induced to increase on the import rates, which 
deteriorated trade balance. Indeed, the negative effects of the appreciated currency on 
the real sector were expected to be compensated by the increased activities of the real 
sector with lower interest rates.   In the first part of the program, the interest rates 
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decreased substantially. However, this decrease could not encourage the firms, which 
were far away from investments for years, for import substitutions and export. 
Consequently, decreased interest rates increased the tendency of consumption and the 
resistance of inflation.  
In addition to real appreciation of currency, increase of oil prices contributed the 
import rates, which increased by 35% in 2002 whereas export increased only 7%. This 
significant difference brought big burden on the capital account.  Substantial 
international reserves accumulated in this period would not be enough to cover 
payments in the event of cease of capital inflow (Akyüz and Boratav, 2002).  
In November 2000, previous month’s high current account deficit and high 
inflation rate deviated from the target level and suspicions about the stabilization 
program arose. In addition to these, political turbulence in the privatization process, 
worsening relationships with European Union, investigation of banks by the Saving 
Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) and effects of the Argentina Crisis depleted the 
confidence of foreign creditors. They refused to renew the contracts and lend more, 
which caused capital outflow and erosion of CBRT’s international reserves. Domestic 
banks tried to exit from lira to decrease their open positions. The interest rates climbed 
and banks having large treasury bills, which funded with the borrowing in overnight 
markets faced with significant losses (Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). CBRT had to choose 
one of two options. CBRT would choose to continue on the crawling peg regime at the 
expense of the deep financial turbulence or to provide liquidity to the financial markets 
with the lender of last resort role at the expense of net domestic asset target (Akyüz and 
Boratav, 2002). Central Bank chose the second option and provided liquidity to the 
banks in trouble, which speeded up the erosion of international reserves.  
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In December 2000, IMF revised the exchange rate-based stabilization program 
with a new ceiling on net domestic assets. In addition to the changes in the program, a 
new agreement compromising financial package with IMF was signed. In the new 
agreement, there were some issues about fiscal and financial policies such as further 
spending cuts and tax increases, revision in agricultural support policies, privatization 
and restructuring of financial sector and extension of guarantees for foreign creditors 
(Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). 
Although Turkey began to recover the 2000 November crisis after this new 
agreement with stop of capital outflow, increased international reserves, decrease of 
import levels and falls in inflation rates, suspicions on the sustainability over the peg 
were not removed. Since the external funds had short maturity, the maturity of the 
treasury bills began to decrease and the interest rates began to increase until 70% in the 
middle of the February. These high rates stimulated the doubts over the sustainability of 
public debts and the banks holding government bonds heavily. Political disturbance in 
the February scared financial markets and attack for the currency began. CBRT was 
obliged to abandon the peg not to lose all international reserves and began to float the 
currency before the pre-announced exit date (Akyüz and Boratav, 2002). 
 
4.5.2 Reasons behind the Crisis 
The 2000 November and the 2001 February crises were faced by Turkey under 
the adoption of a crawling peg regime. The February 2001 crisis had the characteristic of 
twin crises; Turkey faced currency crisis and financial crises sourced from weak banking 
sector at the same time. Turkish economy contracted by more than 9% in 2001, output 
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loss was significant and Turkish Lira lost nearly half of its value (Ozkan, 2005). In this 
period, nearly all aforementioned disadvantages of soft peg regimes appeared. Turkey’s 
exchange rate-based stabilization program with crawling peg regime was exposed to 
speculative attacks, which forced CBRT to abandon the regime and float the currency. In 
addition to these, capital outflows occurred especially in November 2000, misalignment 
of the currency caused enlargement of current account deficit and liability dollarization 
ratio was considerably high. However, in the literature weaknesses of the Turkey’s 
economic and financial structure were criticized for the crises period more than the 
implementation of the soft peg regime. Generally, before providing financial and 
institutional strong framework, implementation of such an ambitious exchange-rate-
based stabilization program augments the likelihood of the crisis. The question about 
sustainability of high public debt ratios, high current account deficit and excessive 
fragile banking sector are usually shown as the main triggering factors of the 2000-2001 
Turkey Crises. In the following section, fiscal appearance, external position and 
financial sector appearance before the crises period will be analyzed. 
a)  Fiscal Appearance 
Turkey had a weak fiscal background before the crises. Although fiscal weakness 
is not usually shown as a sole reason for the financial crises, it is one of the important 
factors to provide confidence in the international markets. Political instability, populist 
policies and inefficient tax system can be counted as the main reasons behind the weak 
fiscal position in Turkey. Political instability since 1980s prevented governments to 
implement successive fiscal policies. To compensate the losers of liberalization period in 
1980s, governments began to subsidize the agricultural sector via state-banks and the 
social security institutions via transfers” (Ozkan, 2005). Populist policies accelerated 
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after 1991 with different coalition governments, which considered next elections 
(Ozkan, 2005). In addition to these populist policies, inefficient tax system without 
superior control mechanism played an important role in the high public deficit. Chart 10 
and 11 show increasing trend in Total Domestic Debt Stock/GDP and Gross External 
Debt Stock/ GDP ratios between 1989 and 2001.  
Chart 10: Total Domestic Debt Stock/ GDP of Turkey (%) 
 
Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury-www.treasury.gov.tr 
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Chart 11: Gross External Debt Stock/ GDP of Turkey (%) 
 
Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury-www.treasury.gov.tr 
Required interest payments and maturity structure should also be considered 
when determining a country’s debt-servicing ability (Ozkan, 2005). In table 19 interest 
payment/GDP ratio’s increasing trend and in table 20 decreases in maturities can be 
observed. 
Years Months Months
1990 2,52 1999-01 13,2 1999-12 15,8
1991 2,67 1999-02 11,3 2000-01 14,8
1992 3,09 1999-03 13,0 2000-02 13,1
1993 4,28 1999-04 11,7 2000-03 16,8
1994 5,94 1999-05 12,4 2000-04 13,1
1995 6,02 1999-06 11,4 2000-05 16,2
1996 8,84 1999-07 15,6 2000-06 16,3
1997 6,72 1999-08 22,1 2000-07 12,9
1998 10,51 1999-09 20,2 2000-08 12,1
1999 12,64 1999-10 21,2 2000-09 15,2
2000 14,77 1999-11 14,6 2000-10 12,6
Data from The Undersecretariat of Treasury (www.treasury.gov.tr)
Source: Ozkan, Gulcin F. (2005). Currency and Financial Crises in Turkey 2000-2001 . 
Blackwell Pulishing
Interest Payment/GDP
Table 19: Interest Payment on 
Domestic Borrowing/GDP
Maturity 
(months)
Maturity 
(months)
Table 20: Maturity Structure of Domestic 
Borrowing
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The IMF stabilization program intended to improve the fiscal situation with 
aforementioned cautions and also succeeded to reach some fiscal targets. In 2000 and 
2001 public sector increased its non-interest budget surplus to 6.1% and 6.7% 
respectively (Yeldan, 2002). However, these reached targets were not enough to 
improve fiscal sustainability. Climbing trend of domestic debt stock, public sector 
borrowing requirement (PSBR) and the burden of government securities with the 
increase of real interest rates contributed unsustainability of fiscal policy (Ozatay and 
Sak, 2002).   
Shortly, unhealthy fiscal appearance of Turkey contributed the overall weakness 
of the economy and inappropriate public finances in the financial system increased the 
fragility of banking sector (Ozkan, 2005). This relationship will be explained in the one 
of the following part. 
b) External Balance 
Although there was an improvement of trade balance in the beginning of the 
stabilization program, in the following period it was deteriorated gradually thereby the 
current account balance. Table 21 demonstrates the evolution of trade account balance 
and current account balance in this period.  
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1996
1997
1998
1999
2000 Q1
2000 Q2
2000 Q3
2000 Q4
2000
Data fom CBRT (www.cbrt.gov.tr)
Source: Ozkan, Gulcin F. (2005). Currency and Financial Crises 
in Turkey 2000-2001. Blackwell Pulishing
Table 21: Trade and Current Account Balances,        
1996-2000       (in million US dollars)
-1360
-2282
-3265
-1194
-3024
-9765
-10443
-3794
-5938
-6253
-6311
-22341
Current Account 
Balance
Trade BalanceYear/quarter
-10582
-15358
-14220
-2437
-2638
1984
 
 
One of the disadvantages of soft pegs, real exchange rate appreciation 
contributed this deterioration. Table 12 shows balance of payment ratios and real 
exchange rate between 1995 and 2001. Inability to decrease the inflation parallel with 
the pre-announced devaluation ratios of the currency induced the real appreciation of the 
currency. As the competitiveness of Turkey decreased, trade account was destroyed. In 
addition to this, increase on imported oil prices contributed the current account deficit 
substantially. 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001*
-1,4 -1,3 -1,4 1,0 -0,7 -4,9 1,9
2,7 3,0 3,7 -0,4 2,5 4,7 -8,7
2,2 1,5 0,0 0,7 0,4 2,0 -7,2
0,5 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,1 1,9
0,1 0,3 0,9 -3,4 1,8 0,5 -2,4
-0,1 0,9 2,5 1,9 0,2 2,1 -1,0
96,9 100 110,5 107,8 108,7 118,2 106,5
Source: Ozatay, Fatih and Guven Sak. (2002). “The 2000-2001 Financial Crisis in Turkey.”
Data from CBRT (www. Cbrt.gov.tr)
*Except real exchange rate, provisional data
** Year-end values, 1995 average= 100. An increase denotes real appreciation.
Real Exchange rate**
Table 22: Balance of Payments (% of GNP)  and real exchange rate
Current Account Balance
Net Capital Inflow
Short Term
Direct Investment
Portfolio Investment
Other Long-term
 
 
On the other hand, external debt of Turkey increased in that period.  Ozkan 
(2005) indicates the importance of ability of a country to service its debt, which is one of 
the indicators of healthy external balance. As table 23 shows, before crisis nearly 80% of 
the exports were used for debt servicing. This high ratio shows the severity of the 
current account deficit in that period.  
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Data from The Undersecretariat of Treasury (www.treasury.gov.tr)
Source: Ozkan, Gulcin F. (2005). Currency and Financial Crises in Turkey 2000-2001. 
Blackwell Pulishing
Table 23:Some Fragility Measures of the External Sector
7,99
9,89
10,9
49,16
47,29
61,22
68,89
78,98
Debt 
Service/GDP
Debt Service/Exports
Interest on External 
Debt/Exports
Years
6,22
6,46
18,08
17,47
17,88
20,5
22,68
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c) Financial Sector Appearance 
Turkish banking system had so many structural and behavioral weaknesses 
before the crisis. The main structural weakness was the lack of effective supervisor and 
regulator skeleton. There was no single regulator for the banks. CBRT, the Under-
secreteriat of Treasury and the Capital Market Board had different regulation and 
supervision roles related to their own interests on the banks, which created confusion 
and some task gaps. The IMF supported stabilization program aimed to improve the 
regulation in the banking sector by establishing Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency (BRSA) as a single supervisor and regulator. However, delays in the 
construction of this institution induced postpones of effective regulation and a stronger 
banking sector before the explosion of crisis. Shortly, lack of effective regulation and 
legal framework on the banking sector increased moral hazard and imprudent actions of 
banks, which will be talked about in the next paragraphs. 
Another weakness of the banking system was the existence of both state banks 
and private banks and their different characteristics. State banks, which were usually 
used as agents of governments’ distributive policies, had accumulated high “duty losses” 
(0zkan, 2005).Short term domestic bank liabilities were not enough to finance their 
increased “duty losses” on the asset side (Ozatay and Sak, 2002). The Treasury’s 
liquidation based on the government securities caused state banks to be more vulnerable 
to interest rate risks (Ozatay and Sak, 2002). On the other hand, private banks had 
substantial open foreign exchange positions generally stemmed from long history of 
high inflation rates and domestic banks’ inability to borrow long term in Lira (Ozatay 
and Sak, 2002). With the adoption of soft peg regime, open foreign position of the 
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private banks increased. Pre-announced devaluation of the peg motivated banks to 
borrow in dollar to buy lira-denominated government bonds (Ozkan, 2005). However, 
the decrease of the nominal interest rates and the inflation rates over the target level 
induced lower returns on both the government bonds and credits to the real sector, 
thereby the profit of the banks decreased. Furthermore, the ratio of the government debt 
instruments in the balance sheet of private banks was quite high in the beginning of the 
program. This high ratio increased the fragility of the system, because there were 
suspicions on turning over the uncollected government debt instruments. 
In addition to these, certain rate of the currency decreased the tendency of 
hedging. The low ratio of foreign exchange assets comparing to the foreign exchange 
liabilities induced private banks to be more vulnerable to the currency risk (Ozatay and 
Sak, 2002). 
Not only open position, but also private banks had maturity mismatch in their 
balance sheet. While the liabilities were usually short-term based, assets were for long-
term.  This maturity mismatch contributed the weakness of the banking sector. In 
addition to these, private banks had substantial foreign exchange rate deposits of the 
residents in their liabilities, which increased the vulnerability for liquidity problems. 
In table 24, main structural weakness of the banking system can be observed. 
Private banks’   vulnerability to currency risk can be observed from the FX deposit/Lira 
deposit ratio and Share of FX loans ratio. Both ratios had an increasing trend before 
2001 crisis. However, state banks were less exposed to the currency risk with quite 
lower FX deposit/Lira deposit and Share of FX loans ratios. The duty losses of the 
public banks were significantly high. The share of interest earning assets decreased, 
which shows banking sector’s support the real sector with credit mechanism decreased. 
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1997 1998 1999 2000/1 2000/2 2000/3 2000/4 2001/1 2001/2
Loan/GDI ** Private 113,72 119,28 82,52 93,26 102,49 111,39 130,7 139 144,97
State 86,24 87,86 66,27 n.a. n.a. n.a. 59,22 n.a. n.a.
Private 212,2 201,63 274,65 285,07 279,99 299,9 209,24 205,37 237,54
State 46,37 35,61 26,49 31,66 32,42 33,13 29,37 37,12 37,12
Private 14,01 13,97 15,91 16,28 16,51 17,1 19,84 20,02 19,55
State 3,07 3,18 2,3 2,13 2,78 2,85 2,54 3,36 2,78
Private 67,8 63,66 63,22 60,79 61,88 60,92 58,05 53,95 52,73
State 36,63 35,34 28,85 n.a. n.a. n.a. 31,88 n.a. n.a.
Private - - - - - - - - -
State 27,07 27,59 32,01 n.a. n.a. n.a. 30,68 n.a. n.a.
Table 24: Structural Characteristics of Private and State banks*
FX***/Lira deposit
Share of FX loans
***FX is foreign exchange
Share of accumulated 
duty losses
Share of interest 
earning assets
Source: Ozatay, Fatih and Guven Sak. (2002). “The 2000-2001 Financial Crisis in Turkey.”
Data from CBRT (www. Cbrt.gov.tr)
*End of period data
** GDI stands for "government debt instrument"
 
 
Table 25 represents the commercial banking sector ratios between 1995 and 2001. 
Decreasing FX assets/ FX liabilities ratio, rapidly increasing FX liabilities- FX assets 
ratio, increasing non-performing loans/total loans ratio and decreasing liquid FX assets/ 
FX liabilities ratios give the signal of increasing commercial banking system’s 
vulnerability to currency risk. 
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000.3 2000.6 2000.9 2000 2001.9
Non-performing loans/ Total loans 2,8 2,2 2,4 7,2 10,7 9,8 9,7 9,3 11,6 18,6
90,6 93,6 89,6 84,9 79,4 74,3 73 71,6 75,9 81
FX liabilities- FX assets (billion $)
Excluding off-the-balance sheet 3 2,5 5 8,4 13,2 17,2 19,2 20,9 17,4 12,4
Including off-the-balance sheet 0,6 1,2 1,9 2,9 2,9 5,7 5,6 5,8 5,5 0,7
44,8 44,6 41 39,5 40 36,6 35,2 34,4 35,9 38,3
46,7 44 41,1 39,9 42,6 42,4 41 38,3 37,9 51,4
Liquid FX assets/ FX liabilities
FX assets/FX Liabilities**
Liquid assets/Total sources***
Source: Ozatay, Fatih and Guven Sak. (2002). “The 2000-2001 Financial Crisis in Turkey.”
Data from CBRT (www. Cbrt.gov.tr)
Table 25: Commercial Banking Sector Ratios (%) *
*End of period figures
**FX denotes " foreign currency denominated"
*** Total Sources= deposits +non-deposits funds
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Chart 12 shows the progress on non-performing loans where chart y shows FX 
assets/ FX liabilities ratio. 2001 crisis period is shown as t (time). Non-performing loans 
increased substantially until t, where FX assets/ FX liabilities ratio decreased 
continuously until t. The upward move of this ratio is coming from the recovery period 
in the last 10 months of 2001 after February. 
Chart 12: Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans in Turkey 
 
Data:  CBRT (www. Cbrt.gov.tr) 
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Chart 13: FX Assets/ FX Liabilities in Turkey 
 
Data:  CBRT (www. Cbrt.gov.tr) 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, four victim countries of currency crises are investigated. Mexico 
and Brazil are investigated as facing with currency crises and balance of payment crises, 
where the East Asia and Turkey are investigated as facing with currency crises and 
financial crises. These four examples has similar characteristic. All of them were 
emerging countries; all attracted too many capital inflow usually short-term based, all 
the countries did not have political stability, all had high amount of foreign debt 
substantially short-term based before the crises. In addition to these, Turkey and the East 
Asian countries had so many fragilities in their banking system and financial structures. 
All the countries were exposed to speculative attacks under the adaptation of the soft peg 
regimes and had to float their currencies with sharp depreciations.  
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Brazil, Mexico and Turkey adapted soft peg regimes as a nominal anchor to fight 
with high inflation rates, where East Asian countries adapted pegged their currencies to 
USA dollar to facilitate external financing of domestic projects. Brazil and Mexico 
managed to decrease inflation rates whereas Turkey was partly successful although she 
could not reach the targeted inflation levels. However all the countries lived soft peg 
regimes disadvantages, such as overvaluation of the currency and its reflections on trade 
balance, excessively borrowing of real and financial sector from abroad without using 
hedging opportunities with the confidence of known future values of their currencies. On 
the other hand, besides these devastating effects of the soft peg regimes, these countries 
had numerous distortions in their macroeconomic and fiscal balances and financial 
structures. These weaknesses attracted the international investors’ attention and with the 
confidence depletion capital outflows began. The reality was, soft peg regimes 
accelerated the speculative attack with depletion of the investors for the central banks to 
defend the currency.  
As a conclusion, soft peg regimes’ effects on the crisis are not ignorable. 
However,   countries’ general monetary, fiscal and financial strong appearance play very 
important role to provide balances in all macroeconomic variables containing exchange 
rate mechanism as it can be observed from the examples investigated in this chapter.  
  
115
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
Akyuz, Yilmaz and Korkut Boratav. 2003. “The Making of the Turkish Financial Crisis.”  
Econpapers No:158 
 
Alesina, Alberto and Alexander F. Wagner. 2004. “Choosing (and Reneging on) Exchange Rate 
Regimes.” NBER Working Paper No. 9809 
 
Angkinand, Apanard. Eric M.P. Chiu and Thomas D. Willet. 2009. “ Testing the Unstable 
Middle and Two Corners Hypotheses About Exchange Rate Regimes”. Open Economies 
Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 
 
 
Babula , A and I. Otker -Robe.2003. “ Are soft pegs and intermediate pegs more prone to crisis? 
Washington” International Monetary Fund: IMF Working Paper. No: 03/223 
 
 
Bordo, Michael D. and Anna J. Schwartz 1997. “Monetary Policy Regimes and Economic 
Performance: The Historical Record”. Nber Working Paper Series No. 6201 
 
 
Bordo, Michael D. 2003. “Exchange Rate Regime Choice in Historical Perspective”. NBER 
Working Paper No. 9654 
 
 
BRSA Working Paper. 2010. “ From Crisis to Financial Stability” (Turkey Experince). 
 
 
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Carmen M. Reinhart. 2000. “ Fear of Floating”. NBER Working Paper 
No. 7993  
 
 
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Frederic S. Mishkin.  2003.  “The Mirage of Exchange Rate Regimes 
for Emerging Market Countries”.NBER Working Paper No. 9808 
 
 
Cardoso, Eliana  and Ann Helwege 1999. “ Currency Crises in the 1990s: The Case of Brazil”  
  
116
Coudert, Virginie and Couharde Cecile. 2008. “ Currency Misalignment and Exchange Rate 
Regimes in Emerging and Developing Countries”. Review of International Economic, 
Vol 17, Issue 1 
 
 
Corsetti ,Giancarlo. Paolo Pesenti and Roubini Nourel 1998. “ What caused the Asian Curreny 
and Financial Crisis? Part 1: A Macroeconomic Overview”.  NBER Working Paper No. 
6833 
 
 
Evangelist, Mike and Valerie Sathe 2006. “ BRAZIL’S 1998-1999 CURRENCY CRISIS”  
 
De Paula, Fernardo and Antonio Jose Alves,JR  2000.” External financial fragility and the 1998-
1999 Brazilian currency crisis” . Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 22, No. 4 
 
 
Edwards, Sebastian 1997.”  The Mexican Peso Crisis: How much did we know? When did we 
Know it?” NBER Working Paper No. 6334 
 
 
Genberg, Hans and Alexander K. Swoboda. 2005. “Exchange-Rate Regimes: Does What 
Countries Say Matter?” Graduate Institute of International Studies Geneva, Switzerland 
 
 
Ghosh, Atish R. Ann-Marie Gulde. Jonathan D. Ostry and Holger Wolf. 1996. “ Does the 
Exchange Rate Regime Matter for Inflation and Growth?” NBER Working Paper No. 
5874 
 
 
Ghosh, Atish R. Ann-Marie Gulde. Jonathan D. Ostry and Holger Wolf.  2002. “ Exchange Rate 
Regimes: Choices and Consequences”.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press 
 
 
Ghosh, Atish R. and Jonathan D. Ostry. 2009. “ Choosing and Exchange Rate Regime”. IMF 
Publications: Finance & Development, December 2009, Volume 46, Number 4  
 
 
Gil-Diaz, Francisco.1998. “The Origin of Mexico’s 1994 Financial Crisis”. The Cato Journal, 
Volume 17. No:3 
 
 
Griffith-Jones, Stephany 1997. “ Causes and Lessons of the Mexican Peso Crisis” WIDER 
working paper No:132 
 
 
Ferreira, Afonso and Giuseppe Tullio 2002. “The Brazilian Exchange Rate Crisis of 
January 1999” Cambridge University Press 
 
 
Fischer,S. 2001. “Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?”  Distinguished 
Lecture on Economics in Government, Journal Of Economics Perspectives, Vol.15 No:2 
  
117
Fischer,S 1998. “The Asian Crisis: a View from the IMF” Journal of International Financial 
Management and Accounting 9:2 1998 
 
 
Frankel, Jeffery. 2004. “Experience and lessons from Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging 
Economies.” In Monetary and Financial Integration in East Asia: The way Ahead, 
edited by Asian Development Bank (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press) 
 
 
Frankel, J.,E.Fajnzylber, S.Schmukler, and L. Serven, 2001. “Verifying Exchange Rate 
Regimes”. Journal of Development Economics, No 66, Volume 2. 
 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey A. 1999. “No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or At All 
Times”. NBER Working Paper No. 7338 
 
 
Habermeier, Karl. Annamaria Kokenyne. Romain Veyrune and Harold Anderson. 2009. 
“Revised System for Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangement”. IMF Working 
Paper. 
 
 
Husain, Asim,  Ashoka Mody and Kenneth Rogoff. 2005. “Exchange Rate Regime Durability 
and Performance in Developing vs. Advanced Economies”. NBER Working Paper No. 
10673  
 
 
IMF Staff. 1998. “The Asian Crisis: Causes and Cures”. International Monetary Publications 
Volume 35, Number 2. 
 
 
Kaminsky, Graciela L. and Carmen Reinhart. 2001. “Bank Lending and Contagion Evidence 
from the Asian Crisis”. National Bureauof Economic Research 
 
 
Kaminsky, Graciela L and Sergio L. Schmukler 1999. “What triggers market jitters? 
  A chronicle of the Asian crisis”. Journal of International Money and Finance 
 
 
Krugman, Paul R. and Maurice Obstfeld. 2004. “International Economics: Theory and Policy”. 
Pearson International Edition 8th Edition 
 
 
Krugman, Paul 1998. “What Happened To Asia?”   
http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/DISINTER.html 
 
 
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo and Federico Sturzenegger. 2005, “Classifying exchange rate regimes: 
Deeds vs. words”. European Economic Review, Volume 49, Issue 6 
Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo and Federico Sturzenegger. 2007. “Fear of Floating in Reverse: Exchange 
Rate Policy in 2000s”.  Bank of England Publications. 
  
118
Mishkin, Frederic S. 1998. “Exchange Rate Pegging in Emerging-Market Countries?”. National 
Bureau of Economic Research 
 
 
Mishkin, Frederic S. 1998. “Lessons from the Asian crisis”. National Bureau of Economic 
Research 
 
 
Ozatay, Fatih and Guven Sak. 2002.  “The 2000-2001 Financial Crisis in Turkey”. Central Bank 
of Turkey and Ankara University  
 
 
Ozkan, Gulcin F. 2005. “Currency and Financial Crises in Turkey 2000-2001”.  The World 
Economy, Volume 28, No:4 
 
 
Rogoff,  Kenneth.Asim  Husain. Ashoka Mody. Robin Brooks and Nienke Oomes. 200 4. 
“Evolution and Performance of Exchange Rate Regimes”. Washington. IMF Working 
Paper. No: 03/243  
 
 
Stone, Mark. Harald Anderson and Romain Veyrune. 2008. “ Exchange Rate Regimes: Fix or 
Float.” IMF Publications. Finance and Development 
 
 
Tavlas, George. Harris Dellas and Alan C. Stockman. 2008. “The Classification and 
performance of Alternative Exchange Rate Systems”. European Economic Review, 
Volume 52, Issue 6. 
 
 
Wade, Robert. 1998. “The Asian Debt-and-development Crisis of 1997-?:” Causes and 
Consequences World Development Vol. 26, No. 8, 
 
 
Wang, Yen Kyun. 2008. “ Flexible BBC Exchange Rate System and Exchange Rate Cooperation 
in East Asia”. Korea Institute for International Economic Policy Working Paper 
 
 
Williamson, John. 2001. “The Case for a Basket, Band and Crawl (BBC) Regime for East Asia”. 
A chapter in Future Directions for Monetary Policies in East Asia, 2001 from Reserve 
Bank of Australia 
 
 
Willet, Thomas D. 2005. “ Why the Middle is Unstable: The Political Economy of Exchange 
Rate Regimes and Currency Crises”. The World Economy, Volume 30, No: 5 
 
 
Whitehead, John C.  1997. “Lessons of the Mexican Peso Crisis” Council on Foreign Relations 
of the United States of America 
 
  
119
Wong, Richard. 2000.  “Asian Financial Crises: Causes and Development.” Hong Kong Institute 
of  Economics and Business Strategy”. The University of Hong Kong. 
 
Yagcı, Fahrettin. 2001. “Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes For Developing Countries”. The 
World Bank  Africa  Region  Working Paper Series No:16. 
 
 
Yeldan, Erinc. 2002. “Behind the 2000/2001 Turkish Crisis: Stability, Credibility and 
Governance, for Whom?” Bilkent University.  
 
 
 
